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Abstract
We consider the problem of designing minimax estimators for estimating the param-
eters of a probability distribution. Unlike classical approaches such as the MLE and
minimum distance estimators, we consider an algorithmic approach for constructing such
estimators. We view the problem of designing minimax estimators as finding a mixed strat-
egy Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game. By leveraging recent results in online learning
with non-convex losses, we provide a general algorithm for finding a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium of general non-convex non-concave zero-sum games. Our algorithm requires
access to two subroutines: (a) one which outputs a Bayes estimator corresponding to a
given prior probability distribution, and (b) one which computes the worst-case risk of
any given estimator. Given access to these two subroutines, we show that our algorithm
outputs both a minimax estimator and a least favorable prior. To demonstrate the power
of this approach, we use it to construct provably minimax estimators for classical problems
such as estimation in the finite Gaussian sequence model, and linear regression.
1 Introduction
Estimating the properties of a probability distribution is a fundamental problem in machine
learning and statistics. In this problem, we are given observations generated from an unknown
probability distribution P belonging to a class of distributions P. Knowing P, we are required
to estimate certain properties of the unknown distribution P , based on the observations.
Designing good and “optimal” estimators for such problems has been a fundamental subject of
research in statistics. Over the years, statisticians have considered various notions of optimality
to compare the performance of estimators and to aid their search of good estimators. Some
popular notions of optimality include admissibility, minimax optimality, Bayesian optimality,
asymptotic efficiency [1, 2]. Of these, minimax optimality is the most popular notion and
has received wide attention in frequentist statistics. This notion of optimality has led to the
minimax estimation principle, where the goal is to design estimators with the minimum worst-
case risk. Let R(θˆ, θ(P )) be the risk of an estimator θˆ for estimating the property θ(P ) of a
distribution P , where an estimator is a function which maps observations to the set of possible
values of the property. Then the worst-case risk of θˆ is defined as supP∈P R(θˆ, θ(P )). The
goal in minimax estimation principle is to design estimators with worst-case risk close to the
best worst-case risk, which is defined as R∗ = inf θˆ supP∈P R(θˆ, θ(P )), where the infimum is
computed over the set of all estimators. Such estimators are often referred to as minimax
estimators [3].
* Equal contribution.
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Classical Estimators. A rich body of work in statistics has focused on studying the min-
imax optimality properties of classical estimators such as the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE), Bayes estimators, and minimum contrast estimators (MCEs) [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Early
works in this line have considered parametric estimation problems and focused on the asymp-
totic setting, where the number of observations approaches infinity, for a fixed problem dimen-
sion. In a series of influential works, Hájek and Le Cam showed that under certain regularity
conditions on the parametric estimation problem, MLE is asymptotically minimax whenever
the risk is measured with respect to a convex loss function [4, 5]. Later works in this line have
considered both parametric and non-parametric estimation problems in the non-asymptotic
setting and studied the minimax rates of estimation. In a series of works, Birgé [7, 8] showed
that under certain regularity conditions on the model class P and the estimation problem,
MLE and MCEs are approximately minimax w.r.t Hellinger distance.
While these results paint a compelling picture of classical estimators, we highlight two key
problem settings where they tend to be rate inefficient (that is, achieve sub-optimal worst-case
risk) [8, 10]. The first is the so-called high dimensional sampling setting, where the number of
observations is comparable to the problem dimension, and under which, classical estimators
can be highly sub-optimal. In some recent work, Jiao et al. [11] considered the problem of
entropy estimation in discrete distributions and showed that the MLE (plug-in rule) is sub-
optimal in the high dimensional regime. Similarly, Cai and Low [12] considered the problem of
estimation of non-smooth functional 1d
∑d
i=1 |θi| from an observation Y ∼ N (θ, Id) and showed
that the MLE is sub-optimal. The second key setting where classical estimators tend to be
sub-optimal is when the risk R(θˆ, θ(P )) is measured w.r.t “non-standard” losses that have a
very different behavior compared to standard losses such as Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
For example, consider the MLE, which can be viewed as a KL projection of the empirical
distribution of observations onto the class of distributions P. By its design, we expect it to
be minimax when the risk is measured w.r.t KL divergence and other related metrics such
as Hellinger distance [8]. However, for loss metrics which are not aligned with KL, one can
design estimators with better performance than MLE, by taking the loss into consideration.
This phenomenon is better illustrated with the following toy example. Suppose P is the set
of multivariate normal distributions in Rd with identity covariance, and suppose our goal is to
estimate the mean of a distribution P ∈ P, given n observations drawn from it. If the risk of
estimating θ as θ˜ is measured w.r.t the following loss ‖θ˜ − θ − c‖22, for some constant c, then
it is easy to see that MLE has a worst-case risk greater than ‖c‖22. Whereas, the minimax
risk R∗ is equal to d/n, which is achieved by an estimator obtained by shifting the MLE by
c. While the above loss is unnatural, such a phenomenon can be observed with natural losses
such as ℓq norms for q ∈ (0, 1) and asymmetric losses.
Bespoke Minimax Estimators. For problems where classical estimators are not optimal,
designing a minimax estimator can be challenging. Numerous works in the literature have
attempted to design minimax estimators in such cases. However the focus of these works is
on specific problems [11, 12, 13, 14], and there is no single estimator which is known to be
optimal for a wide range of estimation problems. For example, Jiao et al. [11], Wu and Yang
[15] considered the problem of entropy estimation for discrete distributions and provided a
minimax estimator in the high-dimensional setting. Cai and Low [12] considered the problem
of estimating a non-smooth functional in high dimensions and provided a minimax estimator.
While these results are impressive, the techniques used in these works are tailored towards
specific problems and do not extend to other problems. So, a natural question that arises
in this context is, how should one go about constructing minimax estimators for problems
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where none of the classical estimators are optimal? Unfortunately, our current understanding
of minimax estimators does not provide any concrete guidelines on designing such estimators.
Minimax Estimation via Solving Statistical Games. In this work, we attempt to tackle
the problem of designing minimax estimators from a game-theoretic perspective. Instead of
the usual two-step approach of first designing an estimator and then certifying its minimax
optimality, we take a more direct approach and attempt to directly solve the following min-max
statistical game: inf θˆ supP∈P R(θˆ, θ(P )). Since the resulting estimators are solutions to the
min-max game, they are optimal by construction. Such a direct approach for construction of
minimax estimators has certain advantages over the classical estimators. First, the technique
itself is very general and can theoretically be used to construct minimax estimators for any
estimation problem. Second, a direct approach often results in exact minimax estimators with
R∗+o(1) worst-case risk. In contrast, classical estimators typically achieve O(1)R∗ worst-case
risk, which is constant factors worse than the direct approach. Finally, a direct approach can
make effective use of any available side information about the problem, to construct estimators
with better worst-case risk than classical estimators. For example, consider the problem of
mean estimation given samples drawn from an unknown Gaussian distribution. If it is known
a priori that the true mean lies in a bounded set, then a direct approach for solving the min-
max statistical game results in estimators with better performance than classical estimators.
Several past works have attempted to directly solve the min-max game associated with the
estimation problem [see 16, and references therein]. We discuss these further in Section 2 after
providing some background, but in gist, existing approaches either focus on specific problems
or are applicable only to simple estimation problems.
This Work. In this work, we rely on recent advances in online learning and game theory
to directly solve the min-max statistical game. Recently, online learning techniques have been
widely used for solving min-max games. For example, Freund and Schapire [17] relied on these
techniques to find equilibria in min-max games that arise in the context of boosting. Similar
techniques have been explored for robust optimization by Chen et al. [18], Feige et al. [19]. In
this work, we take a similar approach and provide an algorithm for solving statistical games.
A critical distinction of statistical games, in contrast to the typical min-max games studied
in the learning and games literature, is that the domain of all possible measurable estimators
is extremely large, the set of possible parameters need not be convex, and the loss function
need not be convex-concave. We show that it is nonetheless possible to finesse these technical
caveats and solve the statistical game, provided we are given access to two subroutines: a
Bayes estimator subroutine which outputs a Bayes estimator corresponding to any given prior,
and a subroutine which computes the worst-case risk of any given estimator. Given access
to these two subroutines, we show that our algorithm outputs both a minimax estimator
and a least favorable prior. The minimax estimator output by our algorithm is a randomized
estimator which is an ensemble of multiple Bayes estimators. When the loss function is convex
- which is the case for a number of commonly used loss functions - the randomized estimator
can be transformed into a deterministic minimax estimator. For problems where the two
subroutines are efficiently implementable, our algorithm provides an efficient technique to
construct minimax estimators. While implementing the subroutines can be computationally
hard in general, we show that the computational complexity can be significantly reduced for
a wide range of problems satisfying certain invariance properties.
To demonstrate the power of this technique, we use it to construct provably minimax es-
timators for the classical problems of finite dimensional Gaussian sequence model and linear
regression. In the problem of Gaussian sequence model, we are given a single sample drawn
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from a normal distribution with mean θ and identity covariance, where θ ∈ Rd, ‖θ‖2 ≤ B. Our
goal is to estimate θ well under squared-error loss. This problem has received much attention
in statistics because of its simplicity and connections to non-parametric regression [20]. Sur-
prisingly, however, the exact minimax estimator is unknown for the case when B ≥ 1.16√d
[21, 22, 23]. In this work, we show that our technique can be used to construct provably min-
imax estimators for this problem, for general B. To further demonstrate that our technique
is widely applicable, we present empirical evidence showing that our algorithm can be used to
construct estimators for covariance and entropy estimation which match the performance of
existing minimax estimators.
Outline. We conclude this section with a brief outline of the rest of the paper. In Section 2,
we provide necessary background on online learning and minimax estimation. In Section 3, we
introduce our algorithm for solving statistical games. In Sections 4, 5, 6 we utilize our algorithm
to construct provably minimax estimators for finite dimensional Gaussian sequence model and
linear regression. In Section 9 we study the empirical performance of our algorithm on a
variety of statistical estimation problems. We defer technical details to the Appendix. Finally,
we conclude in Section 10 with a discussion of future directions and some open problems.
2 Background and Problem Setup
In this section, we formally introduce the problem of minimax statistical estimation and review
the necessary background on online learning.
2.1 Minimax Estimation and Statistical Games
Let P = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rd} be a parametric family of distributions. In this work, we assume
Θ is a compact set. Let Xn = {X1, . . . Xn} ∈ X n be n independent samples drawn from some
unknown distribution Pθ ∈ P. Given Xn, our goal is to estimate the unknown parameter θ.
A deterministic estimator θˆ of θ is any measurable function from X n to Θ. We denote the set
of deterministic estimators by D. A randomized estimator is given by a probability measure
on the set of deterministic estimators. Given Xn, the unknown parameter θ is estimated
by first sampling a deterministic estimator according to this probability measure and using
the sampled estimator to predict θ. Since any randomized estimator can be identified by a
probability measure on D, we denote the set of randomized estimators by MD, the set of all
probability measures on D. Let M : Θ × Θ → R be a measurable loss function such that
M(θ′, θ) measures the cost of an estimate θ′ when the true parameter is θ. Define the risk of
an estimator θˆ for estimating θ as R(θˆ, θ)
def
= E
[
M(θˆ(Xn), θ)
]
, where the expectation is taken
with respect to randomness from Xn and the estimator θˆ. The worst-case risk of an estimator
θˆ is defined as supθ∈ΘR(θˆ, θ) and the minimax risk is defined as the best worst-case risk that
can be achieved by any estimator
R∗ def= inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ, θ). (1)
Any estimator whose worst case risk is equal to the minimax risk is called a minimax estimator.
We refer to the above min-max problem as a statistical game. Often, we are also interested in
deterministic minimax estimators, which are defined as estimators with worst case risk equal
to
inf
θˆ∈D
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ, θ). (2)
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From the perspective of game theory, the optimality notion in Equation (1) is referred
to as the minmax value of the game. This is to be contrasted with the maxmin value of the
game supθ∈Θ inf θˆ∈MD R(θˆ, θ). In general, these two quantities are not equal, but the following
relationship always holds:
sup
θ∈Θ
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, θ) ≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ, θ). (3)
In statistical games, for typical choices of loss functions, supθ∈Θ inf θˆ∈MD R(θˆ, θ) = 0, whereas
inf θˆ∈MD supθ∈ΘR(θˆ, θ) > 0; that is, the minmax value is strictly greater than maxmin value
of the game. So we cannot in general reduce computing the minmax value to computing the
maxmin value.
Linearized Statistical Games. Without any additional structure such as convexity, com-
puting the values of min-max games is difficult in general. So it is common in game theory
to consider a linearized game in the space of probability measures, which is in general better-
behaved. To set up some notation, for any probability distribution P , define R(θˆ, P ) as
Eθ∼P
[
R(θˆ, θ)
]
. In the context of statistical games, a linearized game has the following form:
inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, P ), (4)
where MΘ is the set of all probability measures on Θ. The minmax and maxmin values of
the linearized game and the original game in Equation (1) are related as follows
sup
θ∈Θ
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, θ) ≤ sup
P∈MΘ
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ) ≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, P )
(a)
= inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ, θ),
where (a) holds because for any estimator θˆ, supP∈MΘ R(θˆ, P ) is equal to supθ∈ΘR(θˆ, θ). Thus,
the minmax values of the original and linearized statistical games are equal. Any estimator
whose worst-case risk is equal to the minmax value of the linearized game is a minimax
estimator. The maxmin values of the original and linearized statistical games are however in
general different. In particular, as discussed above, the maxmin value of the original statistical
game is usually equal to zero. The maxmin value of the linearized game however has a deep
connection to Bayesian estimation.
Note that R(θˆ, P ) is simply the integrated risk of the estimator θˆ under prior P ∈ MΘ. Any
estimator which minimizes R(θˆ, P ) is called the Bayes estimator for P , and the corresponding
minimum value is called Bayes risk. Though the set of all possible measurable estimators is in
general vast, in what might be surprising from an optimization or game-theoretic viewpoint,
the Bayes estimator can be characterized simply as follows. Letting P (·|Xn) be the posterior
distribution of θ given the data Xn, a Bayes estimator of P can be found by minimizing the
posterior risk
θˆP (X
n) ∈ argmin
θ˜∈Θ
Eθ∼P (·|Xn)
[
M(θ˜, θ)
]
. (5)
Certain mild technical conditions need to hold for θˆP to be measurable and for it to be a Bayes
estimator [16]. We detail these conditions in Appendix A, which incidentally are all satisfied
for the problems considered in this work. A least favourable prior is defined as any prior which
maximizes the Bayes risk; that is, P˜ is LFP if inf θˆ∈MD R(θˆ, P˜ ) = supP∈MΘ inf θˆ∈MD R(θˆ, P ).
Thus, LFPs solve for the maxmin value of the linearized statistical game. Any prior whose
Bayes risk is equal to the maxmin value of the linearized game is an LFP.
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Nash Equilibrium. Directly solving for the minmax or maxmin values of the (linearized)
min-max games is in general computationally hard, in large part because: (a) these values need
not be equal, which limits the set of possible optimization algorithms, and (b) the optimal
solutions need not be stable, which makes it difficult for simple optimization problems. It is
thus preferable that the two values are equal2, and the solutions be stable, which is formalized
by the game-theoretic notion of a Nash equilibrium (NE).
For the original statistical game in Equation (1), a pair (θˆ∗, θ∗) ∈ MD×Θ is called a pure
strategy NE, if the following holds
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ∗, θ) ≤ R(θˆ∗, θ∗) ≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, θ∗) = inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, θ∗),
where the equality follows since the optimum of a linear program over a convex hull can always
be attained at an extreme point. Intuitively, this says that there is no incentive for any player
to change their strategy while the other player keeps hers unchanged. Note that whenever a
pure strategy NE exists, the minmax and maxmin values of the game are equal to each other:
inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ, θ) ≤ sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ∗, θ) ≤ R(θˆ∗, θ∗) ≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, θ∗) ≤ sup
θ∈Θ
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, θ).
Since the RHS is always upper bounded by the LHS from (3), the inequalities above are all
equalities.
As we discussed above, the maxmin and minmax values of the statistical game in Equa-
tion (1) are in general not equal to each other, so that a pure strategy NE will typically not
exist for the statistical game (1). Instead what often exists is a mixed strategy NE, which is
precisely a pure strategy NE of the linearized game. That is, (θˆ∗, P ∗) ∈ MD ×MΘ is called
a mixed strategy NE of statistical game (1), if
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ∗, θ) = sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ∗, θ) ≤ R(θˆ∗, P ∗) ≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ∗) = inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, P ∗).
As with the original game, if (θˆ∗, P ∗) is a pure strategy NE of the linearized game of (1), aka,
a mixed strategy NE of (1), then the minmax and maxmin values of the linearized game are
equal to each other, and, moreover θˆ∗ is a minimax estimator and P ∗ is an LFP. Conversely, if
θˆ∗ is a minimax estimator, and P ∗ is an LFP, and the minmax and maxmin values of (4) are
equal to each other, then (θˆ∗, P ∗) is a mixed strategy NE of (1). These just follow from similar
sandwich arguments as with the original game, which we add for completeness in Appendix B.
In gist, it might be computationally easier to recover the mixed strategy NE of the statisti-
cal game, assuming they exist, and doing so, would recover minimax estimators and LFPs. In
this work, we are thus interested in imposing mild conditions on the statistical game so that
a mixed strategy NE exists, and under this setting, develop tractable algorithms to estimate
the mixed strategy NE.
Existence of NE. We now briefly discuss sufficient conditions for the existence of NE. As
discussed earlier, a pure strategy NE does not exist for statistical games in general. So, here we
focus on existence of mixed strategy NE. In a seminal work, Wald [24] studied the conditions
for existence of a mixed strategy NE, and showed that a broad class of statistical games have
mixed strategy NE. Suppose every distribution in the model class P is absolutely continuous,
Θ is compact, and the lossM is a bounded, non-negative function. Then minmax and maxmin
2John Von Neumann, a founder of game theory, has said he could not foresee there even being a theory of
games without a theorem that equates these two values
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values of the linearized game are equal. Moreover, a minimax estimator with worst-case risk
equal to R∗ exists. Under the additional condition of compactness of P, [24] showed that
an LFP exists as well. Thus, based on our previous discussion, this implies the game has a
mixed strategy NE. In this work, we consider a different and simpler set of conditions on the
statistical game. We assume that Θ is compact and the risk R(θˆ, θ) is Lipschitz in its second
argument. Under these assumptions, we show that the minmax and maxmin values of the
linearized game in Equation (4) are equal to each other. Such results are known as minimax
theorems and have been studied in the past [24, 25, 26]. However, unlike past works that rely
on fixed point theorems, we rely on a constructive learning-style proof to prove the minimax
theorem, where we present an algorithm which outputs an approximate NE of the statistical
game. Under the additional condition that the risk R(θˆ, θ) is bounded, we show that the
statistical game has a minimax estimator and an LFP.
Computation of NE. Next, we discuss previous numerical optimization techniques for com-
puting a mixed strategy NE of the statistical game. Note that this is a difficult computational
problem: minimizing over the domain of all possible estimators, and maximizing over the set
of all probability measures on Θ. Nonetheless, several works in statistics have attempted to
tackle this problem [16]. One class of techniques involves reducing the set of estimators D via
admissibility considerations to a small enough set. Given this restricted set of estimators, they
can then directly calculate a minimax test for some testing problems; see for instance Hald
[27]. A drawback of these approaches is that they are restricted to simple estimation problems
for which the set of admissible estimators are easy to construct. Another class of techniques
for constructing minimax estimators relies on the properties of LFPs [20, 28]. When the pa-
rameter set Θ is a compact subset of R, and when certain regularity conditions hold, it is well
known that LFPs are supported on a finite set of points [16, 29]. Based on this result, Nelson
[30], Kempthorne [31] propose numerical approaches to determine the support points of LFPs
and the probability mass that needs to be placed on these points. However, these approaches
are restricted to 1-dimensional estimation problems and are not broadly applicable. In a recent
work, Luedtke et al. [32] propose heuristic approaches for solving statistical games using deep
learning techniques. In particular, they use neural networks to parameterize the statistical
game and solve the resulting game using local search techniques such as alternating gradi-
ent descent. However, these approaches are not guaranteed to find minimax estimators and
LFPs and can lead to undesirable equilibrium points. They moreover parameterize estimators
via neural networks whose inputs are a simple concatenation of all the samples, which is not
feasible for large n.
In our work, we develop numerical optimization techniques that rely on online learning
algorithms (see Section 2.2). Though the domains as well as the setting of the statistical
game are far more challenging than typically considered in learning and games literature, we
reduce the problem of designing minimax estimators to a purely computational problem of
efficient implementation of certain optimization subroutines. For the wide range of problems
where these subroutines can be efficiently implemented, our algorithm provides an efficient
and scalable technique for constructing minimax estimators.
2.2 Online Learning
The online learning framework can be seen as a repeated game between a learner/decision-
maker and an adversary. In this framework, in each round t, the learner makes a prediction
xt ∈ X , where X ⊆ Rd, and the adversary chooses a loss function ft : X → R and observe each
others actions. The goal of the learner is to choose a sequence of actions {xt}Tt=1 so that the
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cumulative loss
∑T
t=1 ft(xt) is minimized. The benchmark with which the cumulative loss will
be compared is called the best fixed policy in hindsight, which is given by infx∈X
∑T
t=1 ft(x).
This results in the following notion of regret, which the learner aims to minimize
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)− inf
x∈X
T∑
t=1
ft(x).
When the domain X is compact, and convex, and the loss functions ft are convex:
Under this simple setting, a number of efficient algorithms for regret minimization have been
studied. Some of these include Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) [33, 34], Follow the Per-
turbed Leader (FTPL) [35]. In FTRL, one predicts xt as argminx∈X
∑t−1
i=1 fi(x)+r(x), where r
is a strongly convex regularizer. In FTPL, one predicts xt as Eσ
[
argminx∈X
∑t−1
i=1 fi(x)− 〈σ,x〉
]
,
where σ is a random perturbation drawn from some appropriate probability distribution such
as exponential distribution. These algorithms are known to achieve the optimal O(
√
T ) regret
in the convex setting [34, 36].
When X is compact, but either the domain or the loss functions ft are non-convex:
Under this setting, no deterministic algorithm can achieve sub-linear regret (i.e., regret which
grows slower than T ) [36, 37]. In such cases one has to rely on randomized algorithms to
achieve sub-linear regret. In randomized algorithms, in each round t, the learner samples
the prediction xt from a distribution Pt ∈ MX , where MX is the set of all probability
distributions supported on X . The goal of the learner is to choose a sequence of distributions
{Pt}Tt=1 to minimize the expected regret
∑T
t=1 Ex∼Pt [ft(x)]−infx∈X
∑T
t=1 ft(x). An alternative
perspective of such randomized algorithms is as deterministic algorithms solving a linearized
problem in the space of probability distributions, with loss functions f˜t(P ) = Ex∼P [ft(x)], and
rely on algorithms for online convex learning. For example, by relying of FTRL, one predicts
Pt as argminP∈MX
∑t−1
i=1 f˜i(P )+ r(P ), for some strongly convex regularizer r(P ). When r(P )
is the negative entropy of P , Krichene et al. [38] show that the resulting algorithm achieves
O(
√
dT log T ) expected regret. Another technique to solve the linearized problem is via the
FTPL algorithm [36, 39]. In this algorithm, Pt is given by the distribution of the random
variable xt(σ), which is a minimizer of
∑t−1
i=1 fi(x)− 〈σ,x〉. Here, σ is a random perturbation
drawn from some appropriate probability distribution. In recent work, Suggala and Netrapalli
[36] show that this algorithm achieves O(
√
d3T ) expected regret.
Without any assumptions on X or the loss functions ft. A key caveat with statistical
games is that the domain of all possible measurable estimators is not bounded and is an
infinite-dimensional space. Thus, results as discussed above from the learning and games
literature are not applicable to such a setting. In particular, regret bounds of FTRL and
FTPL scale with the dimensionality of the domain, which is infinite in this case. But there
is a very simple strategy that is applicable without making any assumptions on the domain
whatsoever, but under the provision that ft was known to the learner ahead of round t. Then,
an optimal strategy for the learner is to predict xt as simply a minimizer of ft(x). It is easy
to see that this algorithm, known as Best Response (BR), has 0 regret. While this is an
impractical algorithm in the framework of online learning, it can be used to solve min-max
games, as we will see in Section 3.
FTPL. We will be making use of the FTPL algorithm in the sequel, so we now describe this in
a bit more detail. In this algorithm, the learner predicts xt as a minimizer of
∑t−1
i=1 fi(x)− 〈σ,x〉,
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where σ ∈ Rd is a random perturbation such that {σj}dj=1 i.i.d∼ Exp(η) and Exp(η) is the ex-
ponential distribution with parameter η3. When the domain X is bounded and loss functions
{ft}Tt=1 are Lipschitz (not necessarily convex), FTPL achieves O(
√
d3T ) expected regret, for
appropriate choice of η [36]. A similar regret bound holds even when xt is an approximate
minimizer of
∑t−1
i=1 fi(x)− 〈σ,x〉. Suppose for any t ∈ N, xt is such that
t−1∑
i=1
fi(xt)− 〈σ,xt〉 ≤ inf
x∈X
t−1∑
i=1
fi(x)− 〈σ,x〉+ (α+ β‖σ‖1) ,
where α, β are positive constants. Then FTPL achieves O(T 1/2+αT +βT 3/2) expected regret
for appropriate choice of η (see Appendix C for more details).
3 Minimax Estimation via Online Learning
In this section, we present our algorithm for computing a mixed strategy NE of the statistical
game in Equation (1) (equivalently a pure strategy NE of the linearized game in Equation (4)).
A popular and widely used approach for solving min-max games is to rely on online learning
algorithms [33, 37]. In this approach, the minimization player and the maximization player
play a repeated game against each other. Both the players rely on online learning algorithms
to choose their actions in each round of the game, with the objective of minimizing their
respective regret. The following proposition shows that this repeated game play converges to
a NE.
Proposition 3.1. Consider a repeated game between the minimization and maximization play-
ers in Equation (4). Let (θˆt, Pt) be the actions chosen by the players in iteration t. Suppose
the actions are such that the regret of each player satisfies
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, Pt)− inf
θˆ∈D
T∑
t=1
R(θˆ, Pt) ≤ ǫ1(T ),
sup
θ∈Θ
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, θ)−
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, Pt) ≤ ǫ2(T ).
Let θˆrnd denote the randomized estimator obtained by uniformly sampling an estimator from
the iterates {θˆt}Tt=1. Define the mixture distribution Pavg as 1T
∑T
i=1 Pi. Then (θˆrnd, Pavg) is
an approximate mixed strategy NE of Equation (1)
R(θˆrnd, Pavg) ≤ inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, Pavg) +
ǫ1(T ) + ǫ2(T )
T
,
R(θˆrnd, Pavg) ≥ sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd, θ)− ǫ1(T ) + ǫ2(T )
T
.
Note that the above proposition doesn’t specify an algorithm to generate the iterates
(θˆt, Pt). All it shows is that as long as both the players rely on algorithms which guarantee
sub-linear regret, the iterates converge to a NE. As discussed in Section 2, there exist several
algorithms such as FTRL, FTPL, Best Response (BR), which guarantee sub-linear regret.
It is important to choose these algorithms appropriately as our choices impact the rate of
3Recall, X is an exponential random variable with parameter η if P (X ≥ s) = exp(−ηs)
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convergence to a NE and also the computational complexity of the resulting algorithm. First,
consider the minimization player, whose domainMD is the set of all probability measures over
D. Note that D, the set of all deterministic estimators, is an infinite dimensional space. So,
algorithms such as FTRL, FTPL, whose regret bounds depend on the dimension of the domain,
can not guarantee sub-linear regret. So the minimization player is forced to rely on BR, which
has 0 regret. Recall, in order to use BR, the minimization player requires the knowledge of the
future action of the opponent. This can be made possible in the context of min-max games
by letting the minimization player choose her action after the maximization player reveals her
action. Next, consider the maximization player. Since the minimization player is relying on
BR, the maximization player has to rely on either FTRL or FTPL to choose her action4. In
this work we choose the FTPL algorithm studied by [36]. Our choice is mainly driven by the
computational aspects of the algorithm. Each iteration of the FTRL algorithm of Krichene
et al. [38] involves sampling from a general probability distribution. Whereas, each iteration
of the FTPL algorithm requires minimization of a non-convex objective. While both sampling
and optimization are computationally hard in general, the folklore is that optimization is
relatively easier than sampling in many practical applications.
We now describe our algorithm for computing a pure strategy NE of Equation (4). In
iteration t, the maximization player chooses distribution Pt using FTPL. Pt is given by the
distribution of the random variable θt(σ), which is generated by first sampling a random vector
σ ∈ Rd from exponential distribution and then computing an optimizer of
sup
θ∈Θ
t−1∑
i=1
R(θˆi, θ) + 〈σ, θ〉. (6)
The minimization player chooses θˆt using BR, which involves computing a minimizer of the
integrated risk under prior Pt
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, Pt). (7)
Very often, computing exact optimizers of the above problems is infeasible. Instead, one can
only compute approximate optimizers. To capture the error from this approximation, we
introduce the notion of approximate optimization oracles/subroutines.
Definition 3.1 (Maximization Oracle). A function Omaxα,β (·) is called (α, β)-approximate max-
imization oracle, if for any set of estimators {θˆi}Ti=1 and perturbation σ, it returns θ′ ∈ Θ which
satisfies the following inequality
T∑
i=1
R
(
θ′, θ
)
+ 〈σ, θ′〉 ≥ sup
θ∈Θ
T∑
i=1
R(θˆi, θ) + 〈σ, θ〉 − (α+ β‖σ‖1) .
We denote the output θ′ by Omaxα,β
(
{θˆi}Ti=1, σ
)
.
Definition 3.2 (Minimization Oracle). A function Ominα (·) is called α-approximate minimiza-
tion oracle, if for any probability measure P , it returns an approximate Bayes estimator θˆ′
which satisfies the following inequality
R(θˆ′, P ) ≤ inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, P ) + α.
We denote the output θˆ′ by Ominα (P ).
4If both the players use BR, then both will wait for the other player to pick an action first. As a result, the
algorithm will never proceed.
10
Algorithm 1 FTPL for statistical games
1: Input: Parameter of exponential distribution η, approximate optimization oracles
Omaxα,β (·) ,Ominα′ (·) for problems (6), (7) respectively
2: for t = 1 . . . T do
3: Let Pt be the distribution of random variable θt(σ), which is generated as follows:
(i) Generate a random vector σ such that {σj}dj=1 i.i.d∼ Exp(η)
(ii) Compute θt(σ) as
θt(σ) = Omaxα,β
(
{θˆi}t−1i=1, σ
)
.
4: Compute θˆt as
θˆt = Ominα′ (Pt) .
5: end for
6: Output: {θˆ1, . . . θˆT }, {P1, . . . PT }.
Given access to subroutines Omaxα,β (·) ,Ominα′ (·) for approximately solving the optimization
problems in Equations (6), (7), the algorithm alternates between the maximization and mini-
mization players who choose Pt and θˆt in each iteration. We summarize the overall algorithm
in Algorithm 1. The following theorem shows that Algorithm 1 converges to an approximate
NE of the statistical game.
Theorem 3.1 (Approximate NE). Consider the statistical game in Equation (1). Suppose
Θ ⊆ Rd is compact with ℓ∞ diameter D, i.e., D = supθ1,θ2∈Θ ‖θ1 − θ2‖∞. Suppose R(θˆ, θ) is
L-Lipschitz in its second argument w.r.t ℓ1 norm:
∀θˆ, θ1, θ2 |R(θˆ, θ1)−R(θˆ, θ2)| ≤ L‖θ1 − θ2‖1.
Suppose Algorithm 1 is run for T iterations with approximate optimization subroutines Omaxα,β (·),
Ominα′ (·) for solving the maximization and minimization problems. Let θˆrnd be the randomized
estimator obtained by uniformly sampling an estimator from the iterates {θˆt}Tt=1. Define the
mixture distribution Pavg as
1
T
∑T
i=1 Pi. Then (θˆrnd, Pavg) is an approximate mixed strategy
NE of the statistical game in Equation (1)
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd, θ)− ǫ ≤ R(θˆrnd, Pavg) ≤ inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, Pavg) + ǫ,
where ǫ = O
(
ηd2 + d(βT+D)ηT + α+ α
′
)
.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.1, we show that the minmax and maxmin
values of the statistical game in Equation (4) are equal to each other. Moreover, when the
risk is bounded, we show that the statistical game (1) has minimax estimators and LFPs.
Corollary 3.1 (Minimax Theorem). Consider the setting of Theorem 3.1. Then
inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, P ) = sup
P∈MΘ
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ) =: R∗.
Furthermore, suppose the risk R(θˆ, θ) is a bounded function and Θ is compact w.r.t the follow-
ing metric: ∆M (θ1, θ2) = supθ∈Θ |M(θ1, θ)−M(θ2, θ)|. Then there exists a minimax estimator
θˆ∗ ∈ MD whose worst-case risk satisfies
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ∗, θ) = R∗,
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and there exists a least favorable prior P ∗ ∈ MΘ whose Bayes risk satisfies
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, P ∗) = R∗.
We note that the assumption on compactness of Θ w.r.t ∆M is mild and holds whenever
Θ is compact w.r.t ℓ2 norm and M is a continuous function. As another consequence of
Theorem 3.1, we show that Algorithm 1 outputs approximate minimax estimators and LFPs.
Corollary 3.2. Consider the setting of Theorem 3.1. Suppose Algorithm 1 is run with
η =
√
1
dL2T
. Then the worst-case risk of θˆrnd satisfies
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd, θ) ≤ R∗ +O(d 32LT− 12 + α+ α′ + βd 32LT 12 ).
Moreover, Pavg is approximately least favorable with the associated Bayes risk satisfying
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, Pavg) ≥ R∗ −O(d
3
2LT−
1
2 + α+ α′ + βd
3
2LT
1
2 ).
In addition, suppose the loss M used in the computation of risk is convex in its first argument.
Let θˆavg be the deterministic estimator which is equal to the mean of the probability distribution
associated with θˆrnd. Then the worst-case risk of θˆavg satisfies
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆavg, θ) ≤ R∗ +O(d
3
2LT−
1
2 + α+ α′ + βd
3
2LT
1
2 ),
and θˆavg is an approximate Bayes estimator for prior Pavg.
Remark 3.1 (Near Optimal Estimator). Corollary 3.2 shows that when the approximation
error of the optimization oracles is sufficiently small and when T is large enough, Algorithm 1
outputs a minimax estimator with worst-case risk (1 + o(1))R∗. This improves upon the
approximate minimax estimators that are usually designed in statistics, which have a worst-
case risk of O(1)R∗.
Remark 3.2 (Deterministic Minimax Estimators). For general non-convex loss functions, Al-
gorithm 1 only provides a randomized minimax estimator. Given this, a natural question that
arises is whether there exist efficient algorithms for finding a deterministic minimax estimator.
Unfortunately, even with access to the optimization subroutines used by Algorithm 1, finding
a deterministic minimax estimator can be NP-hard [see Theorem 9 of 18]
Remark 3.3 (Implementation Details). Note that the estimators {θˆi}Ti=1 and distributions
{Pi}Ti=1 output by Algorithm 1 are infinite dimensional objects and can not in general be
stored using finitely many bits. However, in practice, we use independent samples generated
from Pi as its proxy and only work with these samples. Since θˆi is a Bayes estimator for prior
Pi, it can be approximately computed using samples from Pi. This process of approximating
Pi with its samples introduces some approximation error and the number of samples used
in this approximation need to be large enough to ensure Algorithm 1 returns a minimax
estimator. For the problems of finite Gaussian sequence model and linear regression studied
in Sections 5, 6, we show that poly(d) samples suffice to ensure a minimax estimator.
Remark 3.4 (Computation of the Oracles). We now consider the computational aspects in-
volved in the implementation of optimization oracles used by Algorithm 1. Recall that the
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maximization oracle, given any estimator, computes its worst-case risk with some linear per-
turbation. Since this objective could potentially be non-concave, maximizing it can take ex-
ponential time in the worst-case. And recall that the minimization oracle computes the Bayes
estimator given some prior distribution. Implementation of this minimization oracle can also
be computationally expensive in the worst case. While the worst case complexities are pro-
hibitive, for a number of problems, one can make use of the problem structure to efficiently
implement these oracles in polynomial time.
In particular, we leverage symmetry and invariance properties of the statistical games to
reduce the complexity of optimization oracles, while controlling their approximation errors;
see Section 4. We further consider the case where there is no structure in the problem, other
than the existence of finite-dimensional sufficient statistics for the statistical model. This al-
lows one to reduce the computational complexity of the minimization oracle by replacing the
optimization over D in Equation (7) with universal function approximators such as neural
networks. Moreover, one can use existing global search techniques to implement the maxi-
mization oracle. While such a heuristic approach can reduce the computational complexity
of the oracles, bounding their approximation errors can be hard (recall, the worst-case risk
of our estimator depends on the approximation error of the optimization oracles). Neverthe-
less, in later sections, we empirically demonstrate that the estimators from this approach have
superior performance over many existing estimators which are known to be approximately
minimax.
We briefly discuss some classical work that can be leveraged for efficient implementation
of optimization oracles, albeit for specific models or settings. For several problems, it can be
shown that there exists an approximate minimax estimator in some restricted space of estima-
tors such as linear or polynomial functions of the data [12, 40, 41]. Such results can be used to
reduce the space of estimators in the statistical game (1). By replacing MD in Equation (1)
with the restricted estimator space, one can greatly reduce the computational complexity of
the optimization oracles. Another class of results relies on analyses of convergence of posterior
distributions. As a key instance, when the number of samples n is much larger than the di-
mension d, it is well known that the posterior distribution behaves like a normal distribution,
whenever the prior has sufficient mass around the true parameter [42]. Such a property can
be used to efficiently implement the minimization oracle.
4 Invariance of Minimax Estimators and LFPs
In this section, we show that whenever the statistical game satisfies certain invariance proper-
ties, the computational complexity of the optimization oracles required by Algorithm 1 can be
greatly reduced. We first present a classical result from statistics about the invariance prop-
erties of minimax estimators.When the statistical game in Equation (2) is invariant to group
transformations, the invariance theorem says that there exist minimax estimators which are
also invariant to these group transformations [16, 43]. Later, we utilize this result to reduce
the computational complexity of the oracles required by Algorithm 1.
We first introduce the necessary notation and terminology to formally state the invariance
theorem. We note that the theorem stated here is tailored for our setting and more general
versions of the theorem can be found in Kiefer [43]. Let G be a compact group of transfor-
mations on X ×Θ which acts component wise; that is, for each g ∈ G, g(X, θ) can be written
as (g1X, g2θ), where g1, g2 are transformations on X ,Θ. With a slight abuse of notation we
write gX, gθ in place of g1X, g2θ. We assume that the group action is continuous, so that the
functions (g,X) → gX and (g, θ)→ gθ are continuous. Finally, let µ be the unique left Haar
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measure on G with µ(G) = 1. We now formally define “invariant statistical games”, “invariant
estimators” and “invariant probability measures”.
Definition 4.1 (Invariant Game). A statistical game is invariant to group transformations
G, if the following two conditions hold for each g ∈ G
• for all θ ∈ Θ, gθ ∈ Θ. Moreover, the probability distribution of gX is Pgθ, whenever the
distribution of X is Pθ.
• M(gθ1, gθ2) = M(θ1, θ2), for all θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ.
Definition 4.2 (Invariant Estimator). A deterministic estimator θˆ is invariant if for each
g ∈ G, θˆ(gXn) = gθˆ(Xn), where gXn = {gX1, . . . gXn}.
Definition 4.3 (Invariant Measure). Let B(Θ) be the Borel σ-algebra corresponding to the
parameter space Θ. A measure ν on (Θ,B(Θ)) is invariant if for all g ∈ G and any measurable
set A ∈ B(Θ), ν(gA) = ν(A).
Example 4.1. Consider the problem of estimating the mean of a Gaussian distribution. Given
n samples X1, . . . Xn drawn from N (θ, Id×d), our goal is to estimate the unknown parameter
θ. Suppose the parameter space is given by Θ = {θ′ : ‖θ′‖2 ≤ B} and the risk of any estimator
is measured w.r.t squared L2 loss. Then it is easy to verify that the problem is invariant to
transformations of the orthogonal group O(d) = {U : UUT = UTU = I}.
We now present the main result concerning the existence of invariant minimax estimators.A
more general version of the result can be found in [43].
Theorem 4.1 (Invariance). Consider the statistical game in Equation (1). Suppose the game
is invariant to group transformations G. Suppose the loss metric M is convex in its first
argument. Then for any deterministic estimator θˆ, there exists an estimator θˆG which is
invariant to group transformations G, with worst-case risk no larger than the worst-case risk
of θˆ
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆG, θ) ≤ sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ, θ).
This shows that there exists a minimax estimator which is invariant to group transforma-
tions. We now utilize this invariance property to reduce the complexity of the optimization
oracles. Let Θ =
⋃
β Θβ be the partitioning of Θ into equivalence classes under the equiva-
lence θ1 ∼ θ2, if θ1 = gθ2 for some g ∈ G. The quotient space of Θ is defined as the set of
equivalence classes of the elements of Θ under the above defined equivalence and is given by
Θ/G = {Θβ}β . For an invariant estimator θˆ, we define RG(θˆ,Θβ) as R(θˆ, θβ) for any θβ ∈ Θβ.
Note that this is well defined because for invariant estimators R(θˆ, θ1) = R(θˆ, θ2) whenever
θ1 ∼ θ2 (see Lemma E.1). Our main result shows that Equation (1) can be reduced to the
following simpler objective
inf
θˆ∈MD,G
sup
Θβ∈Θ/G
RG(θˆ,Θβ), (8)
where MD,G represents the set of randomized estimators which are invariant to group trans-
formations G. This shows that the outer minimization over the set of all estimators in Equa-
tion (1) can be replaced with a minimization over just the invariant estimators. Moreover, the
inner maximization over the entire parameter space Θ can be replaced with a maximization
over the smaller quotient space Θ/G , which in many examples we study here is a one or
two-dimensional space, irrespective of the dimension of Θ.
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Theorem 4.2. Suppose the statistical game in Equation (1) is invariant to group transforma-
tions G. Moreover, suppose the loss metric M is convex in its first argument. Then,
inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ, θ) = inf
θˆ∈MD,G
sup
Θβ∈Θ/G
RG(θˆ,Θβ).
Moreover, given any ǫ-approximate mixed strategy NE of the reduced statistical game (8), one
can reconstruct an ǫ-approximate mixed strategy NE of the original statistical game (1).
We now demonstrate how Theorem 4.2 can be used on a variety of fundamental statistical
estimation problems.
4.1 Finite Gaussian Sequence Model
In the finite Gaussian sequence model, we are given a single sample X ∈ Rd sampled from
a Gaussian distribution N (θ, I). We assume the parameter θ has a bounded L2 norm and
satisfies ‖θ‖2 ≤ B. Our goal is to design an estimator for θ which is minimax with respect to
squared-error loss. This results in the following min-max problem
inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
‖θ‖2≤B
R(θˆ, θ) ≡ EX∼N (θ,I)
[
‖θˆ(X)− θ‖22
]
. (9)
Theorem 4.3. Let O(d) = {U : UUT = UTU = I} be the group of d× d orthogonal matrices
with matrix multiplication as the group operation. The statistical game in Equation (9) is
invariant under the action of O(d), where the action of g ∈ O(d) on (X, θ) is defined as
g(X, θ) = (gX, gθ). Moreover, the quotient space Θ/O(d) is homeomorphic to the real interval
[0, B] and the reduced statistical game is given by
inf
θˆ∈MD,G
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆ, be1), (10)
where e1 is the first standard basis vector in R
d and MD,G represents the set of randomized
estimators which are invariant to the actions of orthogonal group.
The theorem shows that the supremum in the reduced statistical game (8) is over a bounded
interval on the real line. So the maximization oracle in this case can be efficiently implemented
using grid search over the interval [0, B]. In Section 5 we use this result to obtain estimators
for Gaussian sequence model which are provably minimax and can be computed in polynomial
time.
Estimating a few co-ordinates. Here, we again consider with the Gaussian sequence
model described above, but we are now interested in the estimation of only a subset of the
co-ordinates of θ. Without loss of generality, we assume these are the first k coordinates. The
loss M is the squared L2 loss on the first k coordinates. The following Theorem presents the
invariance properties of this problem. It relies on the group O(k)×O(d− k), which is defined
as the set of orthogonal matrices of the form g =
[
g1 0
0 g2
]
where g1 ∈ O(k) and g2 ∈ O(d−k).
Theorem 4.4. The statistical game described above is invariant under the action of the group
O(k)×O(d−k). Moreover, the quotient space Θ/O(k)×O(d−k) is homeomorphic to the ball
of radius B centered at origin in R2 and the reduced statistical game is given by
inf
θˆ∈MD,G
sup
b2
1
+b2
2
≤B2
R(θˆ, [b1e1,k, b2e1,d−k]), (11)
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where e1,k is the first standard basis vector in R
k and MD,G represents the set of randomized
estimators which are invariant to the actions of orthogonal group.
4.2 Linear Regression
In the problem of linear regression with random design we are given n independent samples
Dn = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 generated from a linear model Yi = XTi θ∗ + ǫi, where Xi ∼ N (0, I), and
ǫi ∼ N (0, 1). We assume the true regression vector is bounded and satisfies ‖θ∗‖2 ≤ B. Our
goal is to design minimax estimator for estimating θ∗ from Dn, w.r.t squared error loss. This
leads us to the following min-max problem
inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
||θ||2≤B
R(θˆ, θ) ≡ EDn
[
||θˆ(Dn)− θ||22
]
. (12)
Theorem 4.5. The statistical game in Equation (12) is invariant under the action of the
orthogonal group O(d), where the action of g ∈ O(d) on ((X,Y ), θ) is defined as g((X,Y ), θ) =
((gX, Y ), gθ). Moreover, the quotient space Θ/O(d) is homeomorphic to the interval [0, B] and
the reduced statistical game is given by
inf
θˆ∈MD,G
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆ, be1), (13)
where MD,G represents the set of randomized estimators which are invariant to the actions of
orthogonal group.
4.3 Normal Covariance Estimation
In the problem of normal covariance estimation we are given n independent samples Xn =
{Xi}ni=1 drawn from N(0,Σ). Here, we assume that the true Σ has a bounded operator norm
and satisfies ‖Σ‖2 ≤ B. Our goal is to construct an estimator for Σ which is minimax w.r.t
the entropy loss, which is defined as
M(Σ1,Σ2) = tr
(
Σ−11 Σ2
)− log |Σ−11 Σ2| − d.
This leads us to the following min-max problem
inf
Σˆ∈MD
sup
Σ∈Ξ
R(Σˆ,Σ) ≡ EXn
[
M(Σˆ(Xn),Σ)
]
, (14)
where Ξ = {Σ : ||Σ||2 ≤ B}.
Theorem 4.6. The statistical game defined by normal covariance estimation with entropy
loss is invariant under the action of the orthogonal group O(d), where the action of g ∈
O(d) on (X,Σ) is defined as g(Xi,Σ) = (gXi, gΣg
T ). Moreover the quotient space Ξ/O(d) is
homeomorphic to ΞG = {λ ∈ Rd : B ≥ λ1 ≥ . . . λd > 0} and the reduced statistical game is
given by
inf
Σˆ∈MD,G
sup
λ∈ΞG
R(Σˆ,Diag(λ)), (15)
where Diag(λ) is the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are given by λ and MD,G repre-
sents the set of randomized estimators which are invariant to the actions of orthogonal group.
The theorem shows that the maximization problem over Ξ can essentially be reduced to
an optimization problem over a d-dimensional space.
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4.4 Entropy estimation
In the problem of entropy estimation, we are given n samples Xn = {X1, . . . Xn} drawn from a
discrete distribution P = (p1, . . . pd). Here, the domain of each Xi is given by X = {1, 2, . . . d}.
Our goal is to estimate the entropy of P , which is defined as f(P ) = −∑di=1 pi log2 pi, under
the squared error loss. This leads us to the following min-max problem
inf
fˆ∈MD
sup
P∈P
R(fˆ , P ) ≡ EXn
[(
fˆ(Xn)− f(P )
)2]
, (16)
where P is the set of all probability distributions supported on d elements.
Theorem 4.7. The statistical game in Equation (16) is invariant to the action of the permu-
tation group Sd. The quotient space P/Sd is homeomorphic to PG = {P ∈ Rd : 1 ≥ p1 ≥ . . . ≥
pd ≥ 0,
∑
i pi = 1} and the reduced statistical game is given by
inf
fˆ∈MD,G
sup
P∈PG
R(fˆ , P ), (17)
where MD,G represents the set of randomized estimators which are invariant to the actions of
permutation group.
5 Finite Gaussian Sequence Model
In this section we consider the finite Gaussian sequence model described in Section 4.1 and use
Algorithm 1 to construct a provably minimax estimator, which can be computed in polynomial
time. This problem has received a lot of attention in statistics because of its simplicity,
relevance and its connections to non-parametric regression [see Chapter 1 of 44]. When the
radius of the domain B is smaller than 1.15
√
d, Marchand and Perron [23] show that the Bayes
estimator with uniform prior on the boundary is a minimax estimator for the problem. For
larger values of B, the exact minimax estimator is unknown. Several works have attempted to
understand the properties of LFP in such settings [45] and constructed approximate minimax
estimators [21]. In this work, we rely on Algorithm 1 to construct an exact minimax estimator
and an LFP, for any value of B, d.
Recall, in Theorem 4.3 we showed that the original min-max statistical game can be reduced
to the simpler problem in Equation (10) To use Algorithm 1 to find a Nash equilibrium of
the reduced game, we need efficient implementation of the required optimization oracles and a
bound on their approximation errors. The optimization problems corresponding to the oracles
in Equations (6), (7) are given as follows
θˆt ← argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
, bt(σ)← argmax
b∈[0,B]
t−1∑
i=1
R(θˆi, be1) + σb,
where DG is the set of deterministic invariant estimators and Pt is the distribution of random
variable bt(σ). We now present efficient techniques for implementing these oracles (Algo-
rithms 2, 3). Since the maximization problem is a 1 dimensional optimization problem, grid
search can be used to compute an approximate maximizer. The approximation error of the
resulting oracle depends on the grid width and the number of samples used to compute the ex-
pectation in the risk R(θˆ, be1). Later, we show that poly(d,B) grid points and samples suffice
to have a small approximation error. The minimization problem, which requires finding an
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Algorithm 2 Maximization Oracle
1: Input: Estimators {θˆi}t−1i=1, perturbation σ, grid width w, number of samples for computation of
expected risk R(θˆ, θ): N1
2: Let {b1, b2 . . . bB/w} be uniformly spaced points on [0, B]
3: for j = 1 . . . B/w do
4: for i = 1 . . . t− 1 do
5: Generate N1 independent samples {Xk}N1k=1 from the distribution N (bje1, I)
6: Estimate R(θˆi, bje1) as 1N1
∑N1
k=1 ‖θˆi(Xk)− be1‖22.
7: end for
8: Evaluate the objective at bj using the above estimates
9: end for
10: Output: bj which maximizes the objective
Algorithm 3 Minimization Oracle
1: Input: Samples {bi}N2i=1 generated from distribution Pt.
2: For any X , compute θˆt(X) as (∑N2
i=1 wibiA(bi‖X‖2)∑N2
i=1 wi
)
X
‖X‖2 ,
where A(γ) =
Id/2(γ)
Id/2−1(γ)
, wi = b
2−d/2
i e
−b2i/2Id/2−1(bi‖X‖2), and Iν is the modified Bessel function
of the first kind of order ν.
invariant estimator minimizing the integrated risk under any prior Pt, can also be efficiently
implemented. As shown in Proposition 5.1 below, the minimizer has a closed-form expression
which depends on Pt and modified Bessel functions. To compute an approximate minimizer of
the problem, we approximate Pt with its samples and rely on the closed-form expression. The
approximation error of this oracle depends on the number of samples used to approximate Pt.
We again show that poly(d,B) samples suffice to have a small approximation error.
Proposition 5.1. The optimizer θˆt of the minimization problem defined above has the follow-
ing closed-form expression
θˆt(X) =

 Eb∼Pt
[
b3−d/2e−b
2/2Id/2(b‖X‖2)
]
Eb∼Pt
[
b2−d/2e−b
2/2Id/2−1(b‖X‖2)
]

 X
‖X‖2 ,
where Iν is the modified Bessel function of first kind of order ν.
We now show that using Algorithm 1 for solving objective (10) with Algorithms 2, 3 as
optimization oracles, gives us a provably minimax estimator and an LFP for finite Gaussian
sequence model.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose Algorithm 1 is run for T iterations with Algorithms 2, 3 as the max-
imization and minimization oracles. Suppose the hyper-parameters of these algorithms are set
as η = 1
B(B+1)
√
T
, w = B
T 3/2
, N1 =
T 3
(B+1)2
, N2 =
T 4
(B+1)2
. Let Pˆt be the approximation of prob-
ability distribution Pt used in the t
th iteration of Algorithm 1. Moreover, let θˆt be the output
of Algorithm 3 in the tth iteration of Algorithm 1.
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1. Then the averaged estimator θˆavg(X) =
1
T
∑T
i=1 θˆi(X) is approximately minimax and
satisfies the following worst-case risk bound with probability at least 1− δ
sup
θ:‖θ‖2≤B
R(θˆavg, θ) ≤ R∗ + O˜
(
B2(B + 1)√
T
)
,
where O˜(.) hides log factors and R∗ is the minimax risk.
2. Define the mixture distribution Pˆavg as
1
T
∑T
i=1 Pˆi. Let PˆLFP be a probability distribution
over Rd with density function defined as pˆLFP(θ) ∝ ‖θ‖1−d2 Pˆavg(‖θ‖2), where Pˆavg(‖θ‖2)
is the probability mass placed by Pˆavg at ‖θ‖2. Then PˆLFP is approximately least favorable
and satisfies the following with probability at least 1− δ
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) ≥ R∗ − O˜
(
B2(B + 1)√
T
)
,
where the infimum is over the set of all estimators.
We believe the polynomial factors in the bounds can be improved with a tighter analysis of
the algorithm. The above Theorem shows that Algorithm 1 learns an approximate minimax
estimator in poly(d,B) time. To the best our knowledge, this is the first result providing
provable minimax estimators for finite Gaussian sequence model, for any value of B.
6 Linear Regression
In this section we consider the linear regression problem described in Section 4.2 and provide
a provably minimax estimator. Recall, in Theorem 4.5 we showed that the original min-max
statistical game can be reduced to the simpler problem in Equation (13). We now provide
efficient implementations of the optimization oracles required by Algorithm 1 for finding a Nash
equilibrium of this game. The optimization problems corresponding to the two optimization
oracles are as follows
θˆt ← argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
, bt(σ)← argmax
b∈[0,B]
t−1∑
i=1
R(θˆi, be1) + σb,
where DG is the set of deterministic invariant estimators and Pt is the distribution of ran-
dom variable bt(σ). Similar to the Gaussian sequence model, the maximization oracle can
be efficiently implemented via a grid search over [0, B] (Algorithm 4). The solution to the
minimization problem has a closed-form expression in terms of the mean and normalization
constant of Fisher-Bingham distribution, which is a distribution obtained by constraining mul-
tivariate normal distributions to lie on the surface of unit sphere [46]. Letting Sd−1 be the
unit sphere in Rd, the probability density of a random variable Z distributed according to
Fisher-Bingham distribution is given by
p(Z;A, γ) = C(A, γ)−1 exp
(−ZTAZ + 〈γ, Z〉) ,
where Z ∈ Sd−1, and γ ∈ Rd, A ∈ Rd×d are the parameters of the distribution with A being
positive semi-definite and C(A, γ) is the normalization constant. Note that the mean of Fisher-
Bingham distribution is given by C(A, γ)−1 ∂∂γC(A, γ). The following proposition obtains a
closed-form expression for θˆt in terms of C(A, γ) and
∂
∂γC(A, γ).
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Algorithm 4 Regression Maximization Oracle
1: Input: Estimators {θˆi}t−1i=1, perturbation σ, grid width w, number of samples for computation of
expected risk R(θˆ, θ): N1
2: Let {b1, b2 . . . bB/w} be uniformly spaced points on [0, B]
3: for j = 1 . . . B/w do
4: for i = 1 . . . t− 1 do
5: Generate N1 independent datasets {Dn,k}N1k=1 from the linear model with true regression
vector bje1
6: Estimate R(θˆi, bje1) as 1N1
∑N1
k=1 ‖θˆi(Dn,k)− be1‖22.
7: end for
8: Evaluate the objective at bj using the above estimates
9: end for
10: Output: bj which maximizes the objective
Algorithm 5 Regression Minimization Oracle
1: Input: Samples {bi}N2i=1 generated from distribution Pt
2: For any Dn, compute θˆt(Dn) as
θˆt(Dn) =
∑N2
i=1 b
2
i
∂
∂γC
(
2−1b2iX
T
X, γ
) ∣∣∣
γ=biXTY∑N2
i=1 biC (2
−1b2iX
TX, biXTY)
,
where X = [X1, X2 . . .Xn]T and Y = [Y1, Y2 . . . Yn].
Proposition 6.1. The optimizer θˆt of the minimization problem defined above has the follow-
ing closed-form expression
θˆt(Dn) =
Eb∼Pt
[
b2
∂
∂γ
C
(
2−1b2XTX, γ
) ∣∣∣
γ=bXTY
]
Eb∼Pt
[
bC
(
2−1b2XTX, bXTY
)] ,
where X = [X1,X2 . . . Xn]
T and Y = [Y1, Y2 . . . Yn].
We note that there exist a number of efficient techniques for computation of the mean
and normalization constant of Fisher-Bingham distribution [46, 47]. In our experiments we
rely on the technique of Kume and Wood [46] (we relegate the details of this technique
to Appendix G.2). To compute an approximate optimizer of the minimization problem, we
approximate Pt with its samples and rely on the above closed-form expression. Algorithm 5
describes the resulting minimization oracle. We now show that using Algorithm 1 for solving
objective (13) with Algorithms 4, 5 as optimization oracles, gives us a provably minimax
estimator and an LFP for linear regression.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose Algorithm 1 is run for T iterations with Algorithms 4, 5 as the max-
imization and minimization oracles. Suppose the hyper-parameters of these algorithms are set
as η = 1
B(B
√
n+1)
√
T
, w = B
T 3/2
, N1 =
T 3
(B
√
n+1)2
, N2 =
T 4
(B
√
n+1)2
. Let Pˆt be the approximation
of probability distribution Pt used in the t
th iteration of Algorithm 1. Moreover, let θˆt be the
output of Algorithm 5 in the tth iteration of Algorithm 1.
1. Then the averaged estimator θˆavg(Dn) =
1
T
∑T
i=1 θˆi(Dn) is approximately minimax and
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satisfies the following worst-case risk bound with probability at least 1− δ
sup
θ:‖θ‖2≤B
R(θˆavg, θ) ≤ R∗ + O˜
(
B2(B + 1)
√
n
T
)
.
2. Define the mixture distribution Pˆavg as
1
T
∑T
i=1 Pˆi. Let PˆLFP be a probability distribution
over Rd with density function defined as pˆLFP(θ) ∝ ‖θ‖1−d2 Pˆavg(‖θ‖2), where Pˆavg(‖θ‖2)
is the probability mass placed by Pˆavg at ‖θ‖2. Then PˆLFP is approximately least favorable
and satisfies the following with probability at least 1− δ
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) ≥ R∗ − O˜
(
B2(B + 1)
√
n
T
)
.
7 Covariance Estimation
In this section, we consider the problem of normal covariance estimation. Recall, in Section 4.3
we showed that the problem is invariant to the action of the orthogonal group and can be
reduced to the simpler problem in Equation (15). The optimization problems corresponding
to the oracles in Equations (6), (7) are as follows
Σˆt ← argmin
Σˆ∈DG
Eλ∼Pt
[
R(Σˆ,Diag(λ))
]
, λt(σ)← argmax
λ∈ΞG
t−1∑
i=1
R(Σˆi,Diag(λ)) + 〈λ, σ〉,
where DG is the set of deterministic invariant estimators and Pt is the distribution of random
variable λt(σ). Note that the maximization problem involves optimization of a non-concave
objective in d-dimensional space. So, implementing a maximization oracle with low approxima-
tion error can be computationally expensive, especially in high dimensions. Moreover, unlike
finite Gaussian sequence model and linear regression, the minimization problem doesn’t have
a closed form expression, and it is not immediately clear how to efficiently implement a min-
imization oracle with low approximation error. In such scenarios, we show that one can rely
on a combination of heuristics and problem structure to further reduce the computational
complexity of the optimization oracles. Although relying on heuristics comes at the expense
of theoretical guarantees, in later sections, we empirically demonstrate that the resulting es-
timators have superior performance over classical estimators. We begin by showing that the
domain of the outer minimization in Equation (15) can be reduced to a smaller set of estima-
tors. Our reduction relies on Blackwell’s theorem, which shows that for convex loss functions
M , there exists a minimax estimator which is a function of the sufficient statistic [4]. We note
that Blackwell’s theorem is very general and can be applied to a wide range of problems, to
reduce the computational complexity of the minimization oracle.
Proposition 7.1. Consider the problem of normal covariance estimation. Let Sn =
∑n
i=1XiX
T
i
n
be the empirical covariance matrix and let U∆UT be the eigen decomposition of Sn. Then there
exists a minimax estimator which can be approximated arbitrarily well using estimators of the
form Σˆf,g(X
n) = U Σ˜f,g(∆)U
T , where Σ˜f,g(∆) is a diagonal matrix whose i
th diagonal entry
is given by
Σ˜f,g,i(∆) = f

∆i,∑
j 6=i
g(∆i,∆j)

 ,
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for some functions f : Rd+1 → R, g : R2 → Rd. Here, ∆i is the ith diagonal entry of ∆.
Moreover, the optimization problem in Equation (15) can be reduced to the following simpler
problem
inf
Σˆ∈Mf,g
sup
λ∈ΞG
R(Σˆ,Diag(λ)) = R∗, (18)
where Mf,g is the set of probability distributions over estimators of the form Σˆf,g.
We now use Algorithm 1 to solve the statistical game in Equation (18). The optimization
problems corresponding to the two optimization oracles are given by
fˆt, gˆt ← argmin
f,g
Eλ∼Pt
[
R(Σˆf,g,Diag(λ))
]
, λt(σ)← argmax
λ∈ΞG
t−1∑
i=1
R(Σˆfˆi,gˆi ,Diag(λ)) + 〈λ, σ〉.
We rely on heuristics to efficiently implement these oracles. To implement the minimization
oracle, we use neural networks (which are universal function approximators) to parameterize
functions f, g. Implementing the minimization oracle then boils down to the finding the
parameters of these networks which minimize the objective. To implement the maximization
oracle, we rely on global search techniques. In our experiments, we use DragonFly [48], which
is a zeroth order optimization technique, to implement this oracle. Note that these heuristics
do not come with any guarantees and as a result the oracles are not guaranteed to have
a small approximation error. Despite this, we empirically demonstrate that the estimators
learned using this approach have good performance.
8 Entropy Estimation
In this section, we consider the problem of entropy estimation. Recall, in Section 4.4 we
showed that the problem is invariant to the action of permutation group and can be reduced
to the simpler problem in Equation (17). Similar to the problem of covariance estimation,
implementing the optimization oracles for this problem, with low approximation error, can be
computationally expensive. So we again rely on heuristics and problem structure to reduce
the computational complexity of optimization oracles.
Proposition 8.1. Consider the problem of entropy estimation. Let Pˆn = (pˆ1, . . . pˆd) be the
observed empirical probabilities. Then there exists a minimax estimator which can be ap-
proximated arbitrarily well using estimators of the form fˆg,h(Pˆn) = g(
∑d
i=1 h(pˆi)), for some
functions g : Rd+1 → R, h : R → Rd+1. Moreover, the optimization problem in Equation (17)
can be reduced to the following problem
inf
fˆ∈Mg,h
sup
P∈PG
R(fˆ , P ) = R∗, (19)
where Mg,h is the set of probability distributions over estimators of the form fˆg,h.
The proof of this proposition is presented in Appendix I.1. We now use Algorithm 1 to
solve the statistical game in Equation (19). The optimization problems corresponding to the
two optimization oracles are given by
gˆt, hˆt ← argmin
g,h
EP∼Pt
[
R(fˆg,h, P )
]
, Pt(σ)← argmax
P∈PG
t−1∑
i=1
R(fˆgˆi,hˆi , P ) + 〈P, σ〉,
where Pt is the distribution of random variable Pt(σ). To implement the minimization oracle,
we use neural networks to parameterize functions g, h. To implement the maximization oracle,
we rely on DragonFly.
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9 Experiments
In this section, we present experiments showing performance of the proposed technique for
constructing minimax estimators. While our primary focus is on the finite Gaussian sequence
model and linear regression for which we provided provably minimax estimators, we also
present experiments on other problems such as covariance and entropy estimation. For each
of these problems, we begin by describing the setup as well as the baseline algorithms, before
proceeding to a discussion of the experimental findings.
9.1 Finite Gaussian Sequence Model
In this section, we focus on experiments related to the finite Gaussian sequence model. We
first consider the case where the risk is measured with respect to squared error loss, i.e.,
M(θ1, θ2) = ‖θ1 − θ2‖22.
Proposed Technique. We use Algorithm 1 with optimization oracles described in Algo-
rithms 2, 3 to find minimax estimators for this problem. We set the hyper-parameters of
our algorithm as follows: number of iterations of FTPL T = 500, grid width w = 0.05 × B,
number of samples for computation of R(θˆ, θ) in Algorithm 2 N1 = 1000, number of samples
generated from Pt in Algorithm 3 N2 = 1000. We note that these are default values and were
not tuned. The randomness parameter η in Algorithm 1 was tuned using a coarse grid search.
We report the performance of the following two estimators constructed using the iterates of
Algorithm 1: (a) Averaged Estimator θˆavg(X) =
1
T
∑T
i=1 θˆi(X), (b) Bayes estimator for prior
1
T
∑T
i=1 Pˆi which we refer to as “Bayes estimator for avg. prior”. The performance of the
randomized estimator θˆrnd is almost identical to the performance of θˆavg. So we do not report
its performance.
Baselines. We compare our estimators with various baselines: (a) standard estimator θˆ(X) =
X, (b) James Stein estimator θˆ(X) =
(
1− (d− 3)/‖X‖22
)+
X, where c+ = max(0, c), (c) pro-
jection estimator (MLE) θˆ(X) = min(‖X‖2, B) X‖X‖2 , (d) Bayes estimator for uniform prior on
the boundary; this estimator is known to be minimax for B ≤ 1.15√d.
Worst-case Risk. We compare the performance of various estimators based on their worst-
case risk. The worst-case risk of the standard estimator is equal to d. The worst case risk
of all the other estimators is computed as follows. Since all these estimators are invariant to
orthogonal group transformations, the risk R(θˆ, θ) only depends on ‖θ‖2 and not its direc-
tion. So the worst-case risk can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
maxb∈[0,B]R(θˆ, be1), where e1 is the first standard basis vector. We use grid search to solve this
problem, with 0.05 ×B grid width. We use 104 samples to approximately compute R(θˆ, be1)
for any θˆ, b.
Duality Gap. For estimators derived from our technique, we also present the duality gap,
which is defined as supθ∈ΘR(θˆavg, θ) − inf θˆ∈D R(θˆ, 1T
∑T
i=1 Pˆi). Duality gap quantifies the
closeness of (θˆavg,
1
T
∑T
i=1 Pˆi) to a Nash equilibrium. Smaller the gap, closer we are to an
equilibrium.
Results. Table 1 shows the performance of various estimators for various values of d,B
along with the duality gap for our estimator. For B =
√
d, the estimators obtained using
Algorithm 1 have similar performance as the “Bayes estimator for uniform prior on boundary”,
which is known to be minimax. For B = 2
√
d, 3
√
d for which the exact minimax estimator
is unknown, we achieve better performance than baselines. Finally, we note that the duality
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Table 1: Worst-case risk of various estimators for finite Gaussian sequence model. The risk is measured
with respect to squared error loss. The worst-case risk of the estimators from Algorithm 1 (last two
rows) is smaller than the worst-case risk of baselines. The numbers in the brackets for Averaged
Estimator represent the duality gap.
Worst-case Risk
B =
√
d B = 1.5
√
d B = 2
√
d
Estimator d = 10 d = 20 d = 30 d = 10 d = 20 d = 30 d = 10 d = 20 d = 30
Standard 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30
James Stein 6.0954 11.2427 16.073 7.9255 15.0530 21.3410 8.7317 16.6971 24.7261
Projection 8.3076 17.4788 26.7873 10.3308 20.3784 30.2464 10.1656 20.2360 30.3805
Bayes estimator
for uniform prior
on boundary
4.8559 9.9909 14.8690 11.7509 23.4726 35.2481 24.5361 49.0651 73.3158
Averaged
Estimator
4.7510
(0.1821)
9.7299
(0.2973)
14.8790
(0.0935)
6.7990
(0.0733)
13.8084
(0.2442)
20.5704
( 0.0087)
7.8504
(0.3046)
15.6686
(0.2878)
23.8758
(0.6820)
Bayes estimator
for avg. prior
4.9763 10.1273 14.8128 6.7866 13.8200 20.3043 7.8772 15.6333 23.5954
gap numbers presented in the table can be made smaller by running our algorithm for more
iterations. When the dimension d = 1, Donoho et al. [40] derived lower bounds for the minimax
risk, for various values of B. In Table 2, we compare the worst risk of our estimator with these
established lower bounds. It can be seen that the worst case risk of our estimator is close to
the lower bounds.
Table 2: Comparison of the worst case risk of θˆavg with established lower bounds from [40] for
finite Gaussian sequence model with d = 1.
B = 1 B = 2 B = 3 B = 4
Worst case risk of
Averaged Estimator
0.456 0.688 0.799 0.869
Lower bound 0.449 0.644 0.750 0.814
9.1.1 Estimating a few coordinates
In this section we again consider the finite Gaussian sequence model, but with a different risk.
We now measure the risk on only the first k coordinates: M(θ1, θ2) =
∑k
i=1(θ1(i) − θ2(i))2.
We present experimental results for k = 1, d/2.
Proposed Technique. Following Theorem 4.4, the original min-max objective can be re-
duced to the simpler problem in Equation (11). We use similar optimization oracles as in
Algorithms 2, 3, to solve this problem. The maximization problem is now a 2D optimization
problem for which we use grid search. The minimization problem, which requires computa-
tion of Bayes estimators, can be solved analytically and has similar expression as the Bayes
estimator in Algorithm 3 (see Appendix F.3 for details). We use a 2D grid of 0.05B width
and length in the maximization oracle. We use the same hyper-parameters as above and run
FTPL for 10000 iterations for k = 1 and 4000 iterations for k = d/2.
Worst-case Risk. We compare our estimators with the same baselines described in the
previous section. For the case of k = 1, we also compare with the best linear estimator,
which is known to be approximately minimax with worst case risk smaller than 1.25 times the
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Table 3: Worst-case risk of various estimators for bounded normal mean estimation when the risk is
evaluated with respect to squared loss on the first k coordinates.
Worst-case Risk
k = 1,B =
√
d k = 1,B = 2
√
d k = 1,B = 3
√
d
Estimator d = 10 d = 20 d = 30 d = 10 d = 20 d = 30 d = 10 d = 20 d = 30
Standard Estimator 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
James-Stein Estimator 2.3796 4.9005 7.3489 2.5087 4.9375 7.3760 2.4288 4.8951 7.3847
Projection Estimator 1.0055 1.4430 2.0424 1.0263 1.1051 1.5077 1.0288 1.0310 1.0202
Best Linear Estimator 0.9091 0.9524 0.9677 0.9756 0.9877 0.9917 0.9890 0.9945 0.9963
Bayes Estimator for
average prior
0.7955 0.8565 0.8996 0.9160 0.9496 0.9726 0.9611 1.0007 1.0172
Averaged Estimator 0.7939 0.8579 0.8955 0.9104 0.9497 0.9724 0.9640 1.0003 1.0101
Worst-case Risk
k = d/2,B =
√
d k = d/2,B = 2
√
d k = d/2,B = 3
√
d
Estimator d = 10 d = 20 d = 30 d = 10 d = 20 d = 30 d = 10 d = 20 d = 30
Standard Estimator 5 10 15 5 10 15 5 10 15
James-Stein Estimator 4.1167 7.9200 11.6892 5.0109 9.7551 14.6568 5.0281 10.0155 14.9390
Projection Estimator 7.1096 15.8166 24.8158 30.3166 66.1806 103.0456 73.4834 156.5076 241.1031
Bayes Estimator for
average prior
3.2611 6.5834 9.8189 4.2477 8.6564 13.0606 4.6359 9.2773 13.9678
Averaged Estimator 3.2008 6.4763 9.7763 4.2260 8.6421 13.0353 4.6413 9.2760 13.9446
minimax risk [49]. Since all these estimators, except the best linear estimator, are invariant
to the transformations of group O(k) × O(d − k), the max risk of these estimators can be
written as maxb2
1
+b2
2
≤B2 R(θˆ, [b1e1,k, b2e1,d−k]). We solve this problem using 2D grid search.
The worst case risk of best linear estimator has a closed form expression.
Results. Table 3 shows the performance of various estimators for various values of d,B. It
can be seen that for B =
√
d, our estimators have better performance than other baselines.
The performance difference goes down for large B, which is as expected. In order to gain
insights about the estimator learned by our algorithm, we plot the contours of θˆavg(X) in
Figure 1, for the k = 1 case, where the risk is measured on the first coordinate. It can be
seen that when X(1) is close to 0, irrespective of other coordinates, the estimator just outputs
X(1) as its estimate of θ(1). When X(1) if far from 0, by looking along the corresponding
vertical line, the estimator can be seen as outputting a shrinked version of X(1), where the
amount of shrinkage increases with the norm of X(2 : d). Note that this is unlike James Stein
estimator which shrinks vectors with smaller norm more than larger norm vectors.
Contours of Estimator d = 10, B =
√
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Figure 1: Contour plots of the estimator learned using Algorithm 1 when the risk is evaluated on the
first coordinate. x axis shows the first coordinate of X , which is the input to the estimator. y axis
shows the norm of the rest of the coordinates of X . The contour bar shows θˆ(1), the first co-ordinate
of the output of the estimator.
25
9.2 Linear Regression
In this section we present experimental results on linear regression. We use Algorithm 1
with optimization oracles described in Algorithms 4, 5 to find minimax estimators for this
problem. We use the same hyper-parameter settings as finite Gaussian sequence model, and
run Algorithm 1 for T = 500 iterations. We compare the worst-case risk of minimax estimators
obtained using our algorithm for various values of (n, d,B), with ordinary least squares (OLS)
and ridge regression estimators. Since all the estimators are invariant to the transformations
of orthogonal group O(d), the max risk can be written as maxb∈[0,B]R(θˆ, be1), which can be
efficiently computed using grid search. Table 4 presents the results from this experiment. It
can be seen that we achieve better performance than ridge regression for small values of n/d,
B. For large values of n/d, B, the performance of our estimator approaches ridge regression.
The duality gap numbers presented in the Table suggest that the performance of our estimator
can be improved for larger values of n/d,B, by choosing better hyper-parameters.
Table 4: Worst-case risk of various estimators for linear regression. The performance of ridge is
obtained by choosing the best regularization parameter. The numbers in the brackets for Averaged
Estimator represent the duality gap.
Worst-case Risk
n = 1.5× d,B = 0.5×√d n = 1.5× d,B = √d
Estimator d = 5 d = 10 d = 15 d = 20 d = 5 d = 10 d = 15 d = 20
OLS 5.0000 2.5000 2.5000 2.2222 5.0000 2.5000 2.5000 2.2222
Ridge regression 0.6637 0.9048 1.1288 1.1926 1.3021 1.4837 1.6912 1.6704
Averaged
Estimator
0.5827
(0.0003)
0.8275
(0.0052)
0.9839
(0.0187)
1.0946
(0.0404)
1.2030
(0.0981)
1.4615
(0.1145)
1.6178
(0.1768)
1.6593
(0.1863)
Bayes estimator
for avg. prior
0.5827 0.8275 0.9844 1.0961 1.1750 1.4621 1.6265 1.6674
Worst-case Risk
n = 2× d,B = 0.5×√d n = 2× d,B = √d
Estimator d = 5 d = 10 d = 15 d = 20 d = 5 d = 10 d = 15 d = 20
OLS 1.2500 1.1111 1.0714 1.053 1.2500 1.1111 1.0714 1.053
Ridge regression 0.5225 0.6683 0.7594 0.8080 0.8166 0.8917 0.9305 0.9608
Averaged
Estimator
0.4920
(0.0038)
0.5991
(0.0309)
0.6873
(0.0485)
0.7339
(0.0428)
0.8044
(0.0647)
0.8615
(0.0854)
0.9388
(0.0996)
0.9621
(0.1224)
Bayes estimator
for avg. prior
0.4894 0.6004 0.6879 0.7320 0.8140 0.8618 0.9375 0.9656
9.3 Covariance Estimation
In this section we present experimental results on normal covariance estimation.
Minimization oracle. In our experiments we use neural networks, which are universal func-
tion approximators, to parameterize functions f, g in Equation (18). To be precise, we use
two layer neural networks to parameterize each of these functions. Implementing the mini-
mization oracle then boils down to finding the parameters of these networks which minimize
Eλ∼Pt
[
R(Σˆf,g,Diag(λ))
]
. In our experiments, we use stochastic gradient descent to learn
these parameters.
Baselines. We compare the performance of the estimators returned by Algorithm 1 for
various values of (n, d,B), with empirical covariance Sn and the James Stein estimator [50]
which is defined as Kn∆JSK
T
n , where Kn is a lower triangular matrix such that Sn = KnK
T
n
and ∆JS is a diagonal matrix with i
th diagonal element equal to 1n+d−2i+1 .
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Results. We use worst-case risk to compare the performance of various estimators. To com-
pute the worst-case risk, we again rely on DragonFly. We note that the worst-case computed
using this approach may be inaccurate as DragonFly is not guaranteed to return a global
optimum. So, we also compare the risk of various estimators at randomly generated Σ’s (see
Appendix J). Table 5 presents the results from this experiment. It can be seen that our es-
timators outperform empirical covariance for almost all the values of n, d,B and outperform
James Stein estimator for small values of n/d, B. For large values of n/d, B, our estimator
has similar performance as JS. In this setting, we believe the performance of our estimators
can be improved by running the algorithm with better hyper-parameters.
Table 5: Worst-case risk of various estimators for covariance estimation for various configurations
of (n, d,B). The worst-case risks are obtained by taking a max of the worst-case risk estimate from
DragonFly and the risks computed at randomly generated Σ’s.
Worst-case Risk
n = 1.5× d,B = 1 n = 1.5× d,B = 2 n = 1.5× d,B = 4 n = 1.5× d,B = 8
Estimator d = 5 d = 10 d = 5 d = 10 d = 5 d = 10 d = 5 d = 10
Empirical Covariance 2.5245 5.1095 2.5245 5.1095 2.5245 5.1095 2.5245 5.1095
James-Stein Estimator 2.1637 4.1704 2.1637 4.1704 2.1637 4.1704 2.1637 4.1704
Averaged Estimator 1.8686 3.1910 1.9371 3.7019 2.0827 4.2454 2.1416 3.9864
Worst-case Risk
n = 2× d,B = 1 n = 2× d,B = 2 n = 2× d,B = 4 n = 2× d,B = 8
Estimator d = 5 d = 10 d = 5 d = 10 d = 5 d = 10 d = 5 d = 10
Empirical Covariance 1.8714 3.4550 1.8714 3.4550 1.8714 3.4550 1.8714 3.4550
James-Stein Estimator 1.6686 2.9433 1.6686 2.9433 1.6686 2.9433 1.6686 2.9433
Averaged Estimator 1.2330 2.1944 1.5237 2.6471 1.6050 3.0834 1.6500 2.9907
Worst-case Risk
n = 3× d,B = 1 n = 3× d,B = 2 n = 3× d,B = 4 n = 3× d,B = 8
Estimator d = 5 d = 10 d = 5 d = 10 d = 5 d = 10 d = 5 d = 10
Empirical Covariance 1.1425 2.1224 1.1425 2.1224 1.1425 2.1224 1.1425 2.1224
James-Stein Estimator 1.0487 1.9068 1.0487 1.9068 1.0487 1.9068 1.0487 1.9068
Averaged Estimator 0.8579 1.3731 0.9557 1.7151 1.0879 1.9174 1.2266 2.0017
9.4 Entropy Estimation
In this section, we consider the problem of entropy estimation described in Section 4.4. Similar
to covariance estimation, we use two layer neural networks to parameterize functions g, h in
Equation (19). Implementing the minimization oracle then boils down to finding the parame-
ters of these networks which minimize EP∼Pt
[
R(fˆg,h, P )
]
. We use stochastic gradient descent
to solve this optimization problem.
Baselines. We compare the performance of the estimators returned by Algorithm 1 for
various values of (n, d), with the plugin MLE estimator −∑di=1 pˆi log pˆi, and the minimax
rate optimal estimator of Jiao et al. [11] (JVHW). The plugin estimator is known to be sub-
optimal in the high dimensional regime, where n < d [11].
Results. We compare the performance of various estimators based on their worst-case risk
computed using DragonFly. Since DragonFly is not guaranteed to compute the worst-case
risk, we also compare the estimators based on their risk at randomly generated distributions
(see Appendix J). Table 6 presents the worst-case risk numbers. It can be seen that the
plugin MLE estimator has a poor performance compared to JVHW and our estimator. Our
estimator has similar performance as JVHW, which is the best known minimax estimator for
entropy estimation. We believe the performance of our estimator can be improved with better
hyper-parameters.
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Table 6: Worst-case risk of various estimators for entropy estimation, for various values of (n, d). The
worst-case risks are obtained by taking a max of the worst-case risk estimate from DragonFly and the
risks computed at randomly generated distributions.
Worst-case Risk
d = 10 d = 20 d = 40 d = 80
Estimator n = 10 n = 20 n = 20 n = 40 n = 10 n = 20 n = 40 n = 20 n = 40 n = 80
Plugin
MLE
0.2895 0.1178 0.2512 0.0347 2.1613 0.8909 0.2710 2.2424 0.9142 0.2899
JVHW [11] 0.3222 0.0797 0.1322 0.0489 0.6788 0.2699 0.0648 0.3751 0.1755 0.0974
Averaged
Estimator
0.1382 0.0723 0.1680 0.0439 0.5392 0.2320 0.0822 0.5084 0.2539 0.0672
10 Discussion
In this paper, we introduced an algorithmic approach for constructing minimax estimators,
where we attempt to directly solve the min-max statistical game associated with the estima-
tion problem. This is unlike the traditional approach in statistics, where an estimator is first
proposed and then its minimax optimality is certified by showing its worst-case risk matches
the known lower bounds for the minimax risk. Our algorithm relies on techniques from online
non-convex learning for solving the statistical game and requires access to certain optimization
subroutines. Given access to these subroutines, our algorithm returns a minimax estimator
and a least favorable prior. This reduces the problem of designing minimax estimators to a
purely computational question of efficient implementation of these subroutines. While imple-
menting these subroutines is computationally expensive in the worst case, we showed that
one can rely on the structure of the problem to reduce their computational complexity. For
the well studied problems of finite Gaussian sequence model and linear regression, we showed
that our approach can be used to learn provably minimax estimators in poly(d) time. For
problems where provable implementation of the optimization subroutines is computationally
expensive, we demonstrated that our framework can still be used together with heuristics
to obtain estimators with better performance than existing (up to constant-factor) minimax
estimators. We empirically demonstrated this on classical problems such as covariance and
entropy estimation. We believe our approach could be especially useful in high-dimensional
settings where classical estimators are sub-optimal and not much is known about minimax
estimators. In such settings, our approach can provide insights into least favourable priors
and aid statisticians in designing minimax estimators.
There are several avenues for future work. The most salient is a more comprehensive
understanding of settings where the optimization subroutines can be efficiently implemented.
In this work, we have mostly relied on invariance properties of statistical games to implement
these subroutines. As described in Section 3, there are several other forms of problem structure
that can be exploited to implement these subroutines. Exploring these directions can help us
construct minimax estimators for several other estimation problems. Another direction for
future work would be to modify our algorithm to learn an approximate minimax estimator
(i.e., a rate optimal estimator), instead of an exact minimax estimator. There are several
reasons why switching to approximate rather than exact minimaxity can be advantageous.
First, with respect to our risk tolerance, it may suffice to construct an estimator whose worst-
case risk is constant factors worse than the minimax risk. Second, by switching to approximate
minimaxity, we believe one can design algorithms requiring significantly weaker optimization
subroutines than those required by our current algorithm. Third, the resulting algorithms
might be less tailored or over-fit to the specific statistical model assumptions, so that the
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resulting algorithms will be much more broadly applicable. Towards the last point, we note
that our minimax estimators could always be embedded within a model selection sub-routine,
so that for any given data-set, one could select from a suite of minimax estimators using
standard model selection criteria. Finally, it would be of interest to modify our algorithm to
output a single estimator which is simultaneously minimax for various values of n, the number
of observations.
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A Measurability of Bayes Estimators
For any prior Π, define pΠ(Xn) as ∫
θ
n∏
i=1
p(Xi; θ)dΠ(θ).
For any prior Π, define estimator θˆΠ as follows
θˆΠ(X
n) ∈ argmin
θ˜∈Θ
Eθ∼Π(·|Xn)
[
M(θ˜, θ)
]
.
Certain regularity conditions need to hold for this to be a Bayes estimator of Π. θˆΠ defined this
way need not be a measurable function of Xn. We now provide sufficient conditions on the statistical
problem which guarantee measurability of θˆΠ. These conditions are from Brown and Purves [51].
Assumption A.1. The sample space Xn and the parameter set Θ are non-empty Borel sets.
Assumption A.2. Let B(Xn) be the Borel σ-algebra corresponding to the sample space Xn and B(Θ)
be the Borel σ-algebra corresponding to parameter space Θ. Let Π be a prior probability measure on Θ.
Suppose, for each θ ∈ Θ, Pθ is such that, for each B ∈ B(Xn), the function θ → Pθ(B) is measurable
w.r.t B(Θ).
Assumption A.3. The loss function M defined on Θ × Θ and taking non-negative real values, is
measurable w.r.t B(Θ)× B(Θ). Moreover, M(·, θ) is lower semi-continuous on Θ, for each θ ∈ Θ.
Under these assumptions, when Θ is compact, Brown and Purves [51] show that there exists a
Borel measurable function θˆΠ such that
θˆΠ(X
n) ∈ argmin
θ˜∈Θ
Eθ∼Π(·|Xn)
[
M(θ˜, θ)
]
.
Moreover, θˆΠ is the Bayes estimator for Π.
B Minimax Estimators, LFPs and Nash Equilibirium
Proposition B.1. Consider the statistical game in Equation (1). If (θˆ∗, P ∗) is a mixed strategy NE
of (1), then the minmax and maxmin values of the linearized game are equal to each other. Moreover,
θˆ∗ is a minimax estimator and P ∗ is an LFP. Conversely, if θˆ∗ is a minimax estimator, and P ∗ is
an LFP, and the minmax and maxmin values of the linearized game (4) are equal to each other, then
(θˆ∗, P ∗) is a mixed strategy NE of (1). Moreover, θ∗ is a Bayes estimator for P ∗.
Proof. Suppose (θˆ∗, P ∗) is a mixed strategy NE. Then, from the definition of mixed strategy NE, we
have
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ∗, P ) ≤ R(θˆ∗, P ∗) ≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ∗).
This further implies
inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, P )
(a)
≤ sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ∗, P ) ≤ R(θˆ∗, P ∗)
(b)
≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ∗)
(c)
≤ sup
P∈MΘ
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ).
Since inf θˆ∈MD supP∈MΘ R(θˆ, P ) ≥ supP∈MΘ inf θˆ∈MD R(θˆ, P ), the above set of inequalities all hold
with an equality and imply that the minmax and maxmin values of the linearized game are equal
to each other. Moreover, from (a), we have supP∈MΘ R(θˆ
∗, P ) = inf θˆ∈MD supP∈MΘ R(θˆ, P ). This
implies θˆ∗ is a minimax estimator. From (c), we have inf θˆ∈MD R(θˆ, P
∗) = supP∈MΘ inf θˆ∈MD R(θˆ, P ).
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This implies P ∗ is an LFP. Finally, from (b), we have R(θˆ∗, P ∗) = inf θˆ∈MD R(θˆ, P
∗). This implies θˆ∗
is a Bayes estimator for P ∗.
We now prove the converse. Since θˆ∗ is a minimax estimator and P ∗ is an LFP, we have
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ∗, P ) = inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, P ), inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ∗) = sup
P∈MΘ
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ).
Moreover, since minmax and maxmin values of the linearized game are equal to each other, all the
above 4 quantities are equal to each other. Since R(θˆ∗, P ∗) ≤ supP∈MΘ R(θˆ∗, P ) and R(θˆ∗, P ∗) ≥
inf θˆ∈MD R(θˆ, P
∗), we have
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ∗, P ) = R(θˆ∗, P ∗) = inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ∗).
This shows that (θˆ∗, P ∗) is a mixed strategy NE of the linear game in Equation (4).
C Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL)
We now describe the FTPL algorithm in more detail. We first introduce the notion of an offline
optimization oracle, which takes as input a function f : X → R and a perturbation vector σ and
returns an approximate minimizer of f(x)−〈σ,x〉. An optimization oracle is called “(α, β)-approximate
optimization oracle” if it returns x∗ ∈ X such that
f(x∗)− 〈σ,x∗〉 ≤ inf
x∈X
f(x)− 〈σ,x〉 + α+ β‖σ‖1.
Denote such an oracle with OFTPLα,β (f, σ). Given access to such an oracle, the FTPL algorithm is given
by the following prediction rule (see Algorithm 6)
xt = OFTPLα,β
(
t−1∑
i=1
fi, σ
)
,
where σ ∈ Rd is a random perturbation such that {σj}dj=1 i.i.d∼ Exp(η) and Exp(η) is the exponential
distribution with parameter η. We now state the following result from Suggala and Netrapalli [36]
which provides an upper bound on the expected regret of Algorithm 6.
Theorem C.1 (Regret Bound). Let D be the ℓ∞ diameter of X . Suppose the losses encountered by
the learner are L-Lipschitz w.r.t ℓ1 norm. For any fixed η, the predictions of Algorithm 6 satisfy the
following regret bound
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)− 1
T
inf
x∈X
T∑
t=1
ft(x)
]
≤ O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ βdL
)
.
Algorithm 6 Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL)
1: Input: Parameter of exponential distribution η, approximate optimization subroutine Oα,β
2: for t = 1 . . . T do
3: Generate random vector σ such that {σj}dj=1 i.i.d∼ Exp(η)
4: Predict xt as
xt = OFTPLα,β
(
t−1∑
i=1
fi, σ
)
.
5: Observe loss function ft
6: end for
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D Minimax Estimation via Online Learning
D.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We have the following bounds on the regret of the minimization and maximization players
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, Pt)− inf
θˆ∈D
T∑
t=1
R(θˆ, Pt) ≤ ǫ1(T ),
sup
θ∈Θ
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, θ)−
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, Pt) ≤ ǫ2(T ).
Now consider the following
inf
θˆ∈D
1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆ, Pt)
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, Pt)− ǫ1(T )
T
≥ sup
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, θ)− ǫ1(T ) + ǫ2(T )
T
,
(20)
where the first and the second inequalities follow from the regret bounds of the minimization and
maximization players. We further bound the LHS and RHS of the above inequality as follows
inf
θˆ∈D
1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆ, Pt) ≤ 1
T 2
T∑
t=1
T∑
t′=1
R(θˆt′ , Pt) = R(θˆrnd, Pavg),
sup
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, θ) ≥ 1
T 2
T∑
t=1
T∑
t′=1
R(θˆt′ , Pt) = R(θˆrnd, Pavg).
Combining the previous two sets of inequalities gives us
R(θˆrnd, Pavg) ≥ sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd, θ)− ǫ1(T ) + ǫ2(T )
T
,
R(θˆrnd, Pavg) ≤ inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, Pavg) +
ǫ1(T ) + ǫ2(T )
T
.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
To prove the Theorem we first bound the regret of each player and then rely on Proposition 3.1 to
show that the iterates converge to a NE. Since the maximization player is responding using FTPL to
the actions of minimization player, we rely on Theorem C.1 to bound her regret. First note that the
sequence of reward functions seen by the maximization player R(θˆi, ·) are L-Lipschitz. Moreover, the
domain Θ has ℓ∞ diameter of D. So applying Theorem C.1 gives us the following regret bound
Eσ
[
sup
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, θ)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, θt(σ))
]
≤ O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ βdL
)
.
Taking the expectation inside, we get the following
sup
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, θ)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆt, Pt) ≤ O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ βdL
)
. (21)
Since the minimization player is using BR, her regret is upper bounded by 0. Plugging in these two
regret bounds in Proposition 3.1 gives us the required result.
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D.3 Proof of Corollary 3.1
Note that this corollary is only concerned about existence of minimax estimators and LFPs, and
showing that minmax and maxmin values of Equation (4) are equal to each other. So we can ignore
the approximation errors introduced by the oracles and set α = β = α′ = 0 in the results of Theorem 3.1
(that is, we assume access to exact optimization oracles, as we are only concerned with existence of
NE and not about computational tractability of the algorithm).
Minimax Theorem. To prove the first part of the corollary, we set η =
√
1
dL2T in Theorem 3.1
and let T →∞. We get
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd, θ) = inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, Pavg)
=⇒ sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆrnd, P ) = inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, Pavg)
=⇒ inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, P ) ≤ sup
P∈MΘ
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P ).
Since minmax value of any game is always greater than or equal to maxmin value of the game, we get
inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, P ) = sup
P∈MΘ
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, P )R∗.
Existence of LFP. We now show that the statistical game has an LFP. To prove this result, we
make use of the following result on the compactness of probability spaces. If Θ is a compact space, then
MΘ is sequentially compact; that is, any sequence Pn ∈MΘ has a convergent subsequence converging
to a point in MΘ (the notion of convergence here is weak convergence). Let Pavg,t = 1t
∑t
i=1 Pi be
the mixture distribution obtained from the first t iterates of Algorithm 1 when run with η =
√
1
dL2T
and exact optimization oracles. Consider the sequence of probability measures {Pavg,t}∞t=1. Since the
parameter space Θ is compact, we know that there exists a converging subsequence {Pavg,ti}∞i=1. Let
P ∗ ∈ MΘ be the limit of this sequence. In the rest of the proof, we show that P ∗ is an LFP; that is,
inf θˆ∈D R(θˆ, P
∗) = R∗. Since R(θˆ, θ) is bounded, and Lipschitz in its second argument, we have
∀θˆ ∈ MD lim
i→∞
R(θˆ, Pavg,ti) = R(θˆ, P
∗). (22)
This follows from the equivalent formulations of weak convergence of measures. We now make use of
the following result from Corollary 3.2 (which we prove later in Appendix D.4)
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, Pavg,t) ≥ R∗ −O(t− 12 ).
Combining this with the fact that supP∈MΘ inf θˆ∈D R(θˆ, P ) = R
∗, we get
lim
i→∞
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, Pavg,ti) = R
∗. (23)
Equations (22), (23) show that inf θˆ∈D R(θˆ, Pavg,ti), R(θ˜, Pavg,ti) are converging sequences as i → ∞.
Since inf θˆ∈D R(θˆ, Pavg,ti) ≤ R(θ˜, Pavg,ti) for all i, θ˜ ∈ D, we have
lim
i→∞
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, Pavg,ti) ≤ lim
i→∞
R(θ˜, Pavg,ti), ∀θ˜ ∈ D.
From Equations (22), (23), we then have
R∗ ≤ R(θ˜, P ∗), ∀θ˜ ∈ D
=⇒ R∗ ≤ inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, P ∗),
35
Combining this with the fact that supP∈MΘ inf θˆ∈D R(θˆ, P ) = R
∗, we get
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, P ∗) = R∗.
This shows that P ∗ is an LFP.
Existence of Minimax Estimator. To show the existence of a minimax estimator, we make
use of the following result from Wald [24], which is concerned about the “compactness” of the space of
estimators MD.
Proposition D.1. Suppose Θ is compact w.r.t ∆M (θ1, θ2) = supθ∈Θ |M(θ1, θ)−M(θ2, θ)|. Moreover,
suppose the risk R is bounded. Then for any sequence of {θˆi}∞i=1 of estimators there exists a subsequence
{θˆij}∞j=1 such that limj→∞ θˆij = θˆ0 and for any θ ∈ Θ
lim inf
i→∞
R(θˆij , θ) ≥ R(θˆ0, θ).
Let θˆrnd,t be the randomized estimator obtained by uniformly sampling an estimator from {θˆi}ti=1.
Consider the sequence of estimators {θˆrnd,t}∞t=1. From the above proposition, we know that there
exists a subsequence {θˆrnd,tj}∞j=1 and an estimator θˆ∗ such that lim infj→∞R(θˆrnd,tj , θ) ≥ R(θˆ∗, θ).
We now show that θˆ∗ is a minimax estimator; that is, we show that supθ∈ΘR(θˆ
∗, θ) = R∗. We make
use of the following result from Corollary 3.2
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd,t, θ) ≤ R∗ +O(t− 12 ).
Combining this with the fact that inf θˆ∈D supP∈MΘ R(θˆ, P ) = R
∗, we get
lim
j→∞
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd,tj , θ) = R
∗. (24)
Since supθ∈ΘR(θˆrnd,tj , θ) ≥ R(θˆrnd,tj , θ˜) for any j, θ˜ ∈ Θ, we have
lim inf
j→∞
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd,tj , θ) ≥ lim inf
j→∞
R(θˆrnd,tj , θ˜) ≥ R(θˆ∗, θ), ∀θ˜ ∈ Θ.
Since {R(θˆrnd,tj , θ)}∞j=1 is a converging sequence, we have
lim inf
j→∞
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd,tj , θ) = lim
j→∞
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd,tj , θ) = R
∗.
This together with the previous inequality gives us supθ˜∈ΘR(θˆrnd,tj , θ˜) ≤ R∗. This shows that θ∗ is a
minimax estimator.
D.4 Proof of Corollary 3.2
Minimax Estimator. From Theorem 3.1 we have
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆrnd, θ) = sup
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
i=1
R(θˆi, θ)
≤ inf
θˆ∈D
1
T
T∑
i=1
R(θˆ, Pi) +O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ α′ + βdL
)
= inf
θˆ∈MD
1
T
T∑
i=1
R(θˆ, Pi) +O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ α′ + βdL
)
(a)
≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, P ) + O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ α′ + βdL
)
,
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where (a) follows from the fact that supθ∈ΘR(θˆ, θ) ≥ 1T
∑T
i=1 R(θˆ, Pi). Substituting η =
√
1
dL2T in the
above equation shows that the randomized estimator is approximately minimax. This completes the
first part of the proof. If the metric M is convex in its first argument, then from Jensen’s inequality
we have
∀θ, R(θˆavg, θ) ≤ R(θˆrnd, θ).
This shows that the worst-case risk of θˆavg is upper bounded as
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆavg, θ) ≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, θ) +O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ α′ + βdL
)
. (25)
Substituting η =
√
1
dL2T in Equation (25) gives us the required bound on the worst-case risk of θˆavg.
LFP. We now prove the results pertaining to LFP. From Theorem 3.1, we have
inf
θˆ∈MD
R(θˆ, Pavg) = inf
θˆ∈MD
1
T
T∑
i=1
R(θˆ, Pi)
≥ sup
P∈MΘ
1
T
T∑
i=1
R(θˆi, P )−O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ α′ + βdL
)
≥ inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
P∈MΘ
R(θˆ, P )−O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ α′ + βdL
)
.
Substituting η =
√
1
dL2T in the above equation shows that Pavg is approximately least favourable.
Now consider the case where M is convex in its first argument. To show that θˆavg is an approximate
Bayes estimator for Pavg, we again rely on Theorem 3.1 where we showed that
sup
P∈MΘ
1
T
T∑
i=1
R(θˆi, P ) ≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆ, Pt) +O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ α′ + βdL
)
.
Since 1T 2
∑T
t=1
∑T
t′=1R(θˆt′ , Pt) ≤ supP∈MΘ 1T
∑T
i=1 R(θˆi, P ), we have
1
T 2
T∑
t=1
T∑
t′=1
R(θˆt′ , Pt) ≤ inf
θˆ∈MD
1
T
T∑
t=1
R(θˆ, Pt) +O
(
ηd2DL2 +
d(βT +D)
ηT
+ α+ α′ + βdL
)
.
Since M is convex in its first argument, we have
1
T 2
T∑
t=1
T∑
t′=1
R(θˆt′ , Pt) ≥ 1
T
T∑
i=1
R(θˆavg, Pi).
Combining the above two equations shows that θˆavg is an approximate Bayes estimator for Pavg.
E Invariance of Minimax Estimators
E.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
In our proof, we rely on the following property of left Haar measure µ of a compact group G. For any
real valued integrable function f on G and any g ∈ G [see Chapter 7 of 52]∫
G
f(g−1h)dµ(h) =
∫
G
f(h)dµ(h). (26)
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We now proceed to the proof of the Theorem. For any estimator θˆ : Xn → Θ, define the following
estimator θˆG
θˆG(X
n) =
∫
G
gθˆ(g−1Xn)dµ(g),
where µ is the left Haar measure on G and gXn = {gX1, . . . gXn}. The above integral is well defined
because θˆ is measurable, G is compact and the action of the group G is continuous. We first show that
θˆG is invariant under group transformations G. For any h ∈ G, consider the following
θˆG(hX
n) =
∫
G
gθˆ((g−1h)Xn)dµ(g)
=
∫
G
h(h−1g)θˆ((h−1g)−1Xn)dµ(g)
= h
[∫
G
(h−1g)θˆ((h−1g)−1Xn)dµ(g)
]
(a)
= h
[∫
G
gθˆ(g−1Xn)dµ(g)
]
= hθˆG(X
n),
where (a) follows from Equation (26). This shows that θˆG is an invariant estimator. We now show
that the worst case risk of θˆG is less than or equal to the worst case risk of θˆ. Consider the following
upper bound on the risk of θˆG at any θ ∈ Θ
R(θˆG, θ) = EXn∼Pn
θ
[
M(θˆG(X
n), θ)
]
≤ EXn∼Pn
θ
[∫
G
M(gθˆ(g−1Xn), θ)dµ(g)
]
(convexity of M)
= EXn∼Pn
θ
[
Eg∼µ
[
M(gθˆ(g−1Xn), θ)
]]
(a)
= Eg∼µ
[
EXn∼Pn
g−1θ
[
M(gθˆ(Xn), θ)
]]
(change of variables)
(b)
= Eg∼µ
[
EXn∼Pn
g−1θ
[
M(θˆ(Xn), g−1θ)
]]
(invariance of M)
= Eg∼µ
[
R(θˆ, g−1θ)
]
≤ sup
θ′∈Θ
R(θˆ, θ′),
where (a) follows from Fubini’s theorem and change of variables X ′ = g−1X and the fact that if
X ∼ Pθ, then g−1X ∼ Pg−1θ. (b) follows from the invariance property of the metric M . This shows
that supθ∈ΘR(θˆG, θ) ≤ supθ∈ΘR(θˆ, θ). This shows that we can always improve a given estimator by
averaging over the group G and hence there should be a minimax estimator which is invariant under
the action of G.
E.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
E.2.1 Intermediate Results
We first prove some intermediate results which we require in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Lemma E.1. Suppose θˆ is a deterministic estimator that is invariant to group transformations G.
Then R(θˆ, θ1) = R(θˆ, θ2), whenever θ1 ∼ θ2.
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Proof. Suppose θ2 = gθ1 for some g ∈ G. From the definition of R(θˆ, gθ1) we have
R(θˆ, θ2) = R(θˆ, gθ1) = EXn∼Pn
gθ1
[
M(θˆ(Xn), gθ1)
]
= EXn∼Pn
gθ1
[
M(g−1θˆ(Xn), θ1)
]
(invariance of loss metric)
= EXn∼Pn
gθ1
[
M(θˆ(g−1Xn), θ1)
]
(invariance of estimator)
(a)
= EXn∼Pn
θ1
[
M(θˆ(Xn), θ1)
]
= R(θˆ, θ1),
where (a) follows from the fact that gX ∼ Pgθ whenever X ∼ Pθ. This shows that R(θˆ, θ1) =
R(θˆ, θ2).
Lemma E.2. Suppose Π is a probability distribution which is invariant to group transformations G.
For any deterministic estimator θˆ, there exists an invariant estimator θˆG such that the Bayes risk of
θˆG is no larger than the Bayes risk of θˆ
R(θˆ,Π) ≥ R(θˆG,Π).
Proof. Define estimator θˆG as follows
θˆG(X
n) =
∫
G
gθˆ(g−1Xn)dµ(g),
where µ is the left Haar measure on G. Note that, in the proof of Theorem 4.1 we showed that this
estimator is invariance to the action of group G. We now show that the Bayes risk of θˆG is less than
equal to the Bayes risk of θˆ. Consider the following
R(θˆG,Π) = Eθ∼Π[R(θˆG, θ)]
= Eθ∼Π
[
EXn∼Pn
θ
[
M
(∫
G
gθˆ(g−1Xn)dµ(g), θ
)]]
(a)
≤ Eθ∼Π
[
EXn∼Pn
θ
[
Eg∼µ
[
M
(
gθˆ(g−1Xn), θ
)]]]
= Eg∼µ
[
Eθ∼Π
[
EXn∼Pn
θ
[
M
(
gθˆ(g−1Xn), θ
)]]]
(b)
= Eg∼µ
[
Eθ∼Π
[
EXn∼Pn
θ
[
M
(
θˆ(g−1Xn), g−1θ
)]]]
= Eg∼µ
[
Eθ∼Π
[
R(θˆ, g−1θ)
]]
(c)
= Eθ∼Π
[
R(θˆ, θ)
]
,
where (a) uses convexity of M and follows from Jensen’s inequality, (b) follows from the invariance of
M and (c) follows from the invariance of distribution Π to actions of group G.
E.2.2 Main Argument
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 4.2. We first prove the second part of the Theorem. The first
part immediately follows from the proof of second part. Suppose (θˆ∗G, P
∗
G) is an ǫ-approximate mixed
strategy Nash equilibirium of the reduced statistical game in Equation (8). Our goal is to construct
an approximate Nash equilibrium of the original statistical game in Equation (1), using (θˆ∗G, P
∗
G).
Note that θˆ∗G is a randomized estimator over the set of deterministic invariant estimators DG and
P ∗G is a distribution on the quotient space Θ/G. To construct an approximate Nash equilibrium of the
original statistical game (1), we extend P ∗G to the entire parameter space Θ. We rely on Bourbaki’s
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approach to measure theory, which is equivalent to classical measure theory in the setting of locally
compact spaces we consider in this work [52]. In Bourbaki’s approach, any measure ν on a set Θ is
defined as a linear functional on the set of integrable functions (that is, a measure is defined by its
action on integrable functions)
ν[f ] =
∫
Θ
f(θ)dν(θ).
We define P ∗, the extension of P ∗G to the entire parameter space Θ, as follows
P ∗[f ] =
∫
Θ/G
f ′(Θβ)dP
∗
G(Θβ),
where f ′ : Θ/G→ R is a function that depends on f , and is defined as follows. First define fI : Θ→ R,
an invariant function constructed using f , as fI(θ) =
∫
Θ f(gθ)dµ(g), where µ is the left invariant Haar
measure of G. From Equation (26), it is easy to see that fI(hθ) = fI(θ), for all h ∈ G. So fI is
constant on the equivalence classes of Θ. So fI can be written in terms of a function f ′ : Θ/G → R,
as follows
fI = f
′ ◦ γ,
where γ : Θ → Θ/G is the orbit projection function which projects θ ∈ Θ onto the quotient space.
We first show that P ∗ defined this way is an invariant measure. To this end, we use the following
equivalent definition of an invariant measure.
Proposition E.1. A probability measure ν on Θ is invariant to transformations of group G iff for
any ν-integrable function f and for any h ∈ G, ∫ f(θ)dν(θ) = ∫ f(hθ)dν(θ).
Since fI is an invariant function, relying on the above proposition, it is easy to see that P ∗ is an
invariant measure. We now show that (θˆ∗G, P
∗) is an ǫ-approximate mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
of Equation (1). Since (θˆ∗G, P
∗
G) is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of Equation (8), we have
sup
Θβ∈Θ/G
RG(θˆ
∗
G,Θβ)− ǫ ≤ EΘβ∼P∗G [RG(θˆ∗G,Θβ)] ≤ inf
θˆ∈DG
EΘβ∼P∗G
[RG(θˆ,Θβ)] + ǫ, (27)
where DG is the set of deterministic invariant estimators. Now consider the following
Eθ∼P∗ [R(θˆ
∗
G, θ)]
(a)
= EΘβ∼P∗G [RG(θˆ
∗
G,Θβ)] (Lemma E.1)
≤ inf
θˆ∈DG
EΘβ∼P∗G
[RG(θˆ,Θβ)] + ǫ (Equation (27))
= inf
θˆ∈DG
Eθ∼P∗ [R(θˆ, θ)] + ǫ (definition of P ∗)
(b)
= inf
θˆ∈D
Eθ∼P∗ [R(θˆ, θ)] + ǫ (Lemma E.2),
where (a) follows from the definition of P ∗ and Lemma E.1. (b) follows from the fact that for any
invariant prior, there exists a Bayes estimator which is invariant to group transformations (Lemma E.2).
Next, we provide a lower bound for Eθ∼P∗ [R(θˆ∗G, θ)]
Eθ∼P∗ [R(θˆ
∗
G, θ)] = EΘβ∼P∗G [RG(θˆ
∗
G,Θβ)]
≥ sup
Θβ∈Θ/G
RG(θˆ
∗
G,Θβ)− ǫ
= sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ∗G, θ)− ǫ (Lemma E.1)
The upper and lower bounds for Eθ∼P∗ [R(θˆ∗G, θ)] derived in the previous two equations shows that
(θˆ∗G, P
∗) is an ǫ-approximate mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the original statistical game in Equa-
tion 1. The above inequalites also show that
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ∗G, θ)− ǫ ≤ EΘβ∼P∗G [RG(θˆ∗G,Θβ)] ≤ inf
θˆ∈D
Eθ∼P∗ [R(θˆ, θ)] + ǫ.
40
This, together with Equation (27), shows that
inf
θˆ∈MD
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆ, θ) = inf
θˆ∈MD,G
sup
Θβ∈Θ/G
RG(θˆ,Θβ).
E.3 Applications of Invariance Theorem
In our proofs, we establish homeomorphisms between the quotient spaces and another natural space
over which we run our algorithm. Note that establishing a homeomorphism is sufficient since we are
only dealing with Borel σ-algebras on our spaces and homeomorphism would imply that there is an
isomorphism between the Borel σ-algebras of the two spaces. Hence, measures learnt on one space can
be transferred to another.
E.3.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3
First note that for any g ∈ O(d) and θ ∈ Θ, we have gθ ∈ Θ and the distribution of gX is Pgθ .
Moreover, for any orthogonal matrix g ∈ O(d) we have ‖gθ − gX‖2 = ‖θ − X‖2, which implies the
statistical game is invariant to group transformations G.
For the second part, note that for any θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ such that ‖θ1‖2 = ‖θ2‖2, ∃g ∈ O(d) s.t. gθ1 = θ2.
Mapping all elements to their norm gives us a bijection between the quotient space and the interval
[0, B]. The continuity of this bijection and it’s inverse can easily be checked using the standard basis
for both the topologies.
E.3.2 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Note that for any θ ∈ Θ, gθ = [g1θ1:k, g2θk+1:d] ∈ Θ. Since g1 is orthogonal, for any θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ we
have ‖g1θ1:k1 − g1θ1:k2 ‖ = ‖θ1:k1 − θ1:k2 ‖. Hence the invariance of the statistical game follows.
Now, for any θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ such that ‖θ1:k1 ‖ = ‖θ1:k2 ‖ and ‖θk+1:d1 ‖ = ‖θk+1:d2 ‖, ∃g1 ∈ O(k) and
g2 ∈ O(d − k) such that g1θ1:k1 = θ1:k2 and g2θk+1:d1 = θk+1:d2 . Hence ∃g ∈ O(k) × O(d − k) such that
gθ1 = θ2. This means that in each equivalence class the parameters B1 = ‖θ1:k1 ‖2 and B2 = ‖θk+1:d1 ‖2
are constant. Since ‖θ‖2 ≤ B we have B1 + B2 ≤ B, this gives us a bijection. The continuity of this
bijection and it’s inverse can easily be checked using the standard basis for both the topologies.
E.3.3 Proof of Theorem 4.5
We define the action of any g ∈ O(d) on the samples {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 as transforming them to {(gXi, Yi)}ni=1.
Since Yi = XTi θ+ ǫi = X
T
i g
T gθ+ ǫi = (gXi)
T gθ+ ǫi and ‖gθ1− gθ2‖ = ‖θ1− θ2‖ for any θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ we
have the invariance of the statistical game. The rest of the proof uses similar arguments as in Theorem
4.3.
E.3.4 Proof of Theorem 4.6
First note that for any Σ such that ‖Σ‖2 ≤ B, and any g ∈ O(d), we have ‖gΣgT‖ ≤ B. If X ∼ N(0,Σ)
then for any g ∈ O(d)
E[gXXTgT ] = gE[XXT ]gT = gΣgT .
Hence gX ∼ N(0, gΣgT ). Moreover, we have
M(gΣ1g
T , gΣ2g
T )
= tr
(
(gΣ1g
T )−1gΣ2g
T
)− log |(gΣ1gT )−1gΣ2gT | − d
= tr
(
gΣ−11 g
T gΣ−12 g
T
)− log |gΣ−11 gT gΣ−12 gT | − d
= tr(gΣ−11 Σ2g
T )− log |gΣ−11 Σ2gT | − d
= M(Σ1,Σ2),
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where the last equality follows from the invariance of trace to multiplication with orthogonal matrices
and the property of the determinant to split over the multiplication of matrices. This shows the desired
invariance of the statistical game.
Now, consider two covariance matrices Σ1,Σ2 with singular value decompositions (SVD) Σ1 =
U1∆1U
T
1 and Σ2 = U2∆2U
T
2 respectively. Here all matrices are square and of full rank. In particular,
∆1 and ∆2 are diagonal matrices with decreasing entries from left to right and, U1 and U2 are orthog-
onal matrices. Since the orthogonal group is transitive ∃g ∈ O(d) such that gU1 = U2. If ∆1 = ∆2
we have gΣ1gT = Σ2. Hence under the action of O(d), all covariance matrices with the same singular
values fall in the same equivalence class. It is easy to see that this is also a necessary condition. These
equivalence classes naturally form a bijection with a sequence of d decreasing positive real numbers
bounded above by B. The continuity of this bijection and it’s inverse can easily be checked using the
standard basis for both the topologies.
E.3.5 Proof of Theorem 4.7
Let P,Q be any two distributions on d elements {1, . . . d} such that ∃g ∈ Sd s.t. gP = Q. They are
indistinguishable from the samples they generate. Since the entropy is defined as
f(P ) = −
d∑
i=1
pi log(pi)
it doesn’t depend upon the ordering of the individual probabilites. Hence the statistical game is
invariant under the action of Sd.
Since using a permutation we can always order a given set of probabilities in decreasing order,
there is a natural bijection between the quotient space and the given space. The continuity of this
map and it’s inverse can easily be checked using the standard basis for both the topologies.
E.3.6 Mixture of Gaussians
In the problem of mixture of Gaussians we are given n samples X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Rd which come from a
mixture distribution of k Gaussians with different means
Pθ =
k∑
i=1
piN (θi,Σi).
We assume that all k Gaussians have the same covariance, let’s say identity, and we also assume that
we know the mixture probabilities. Finally, we assume that the mean vectors θi are such that ‖θi‖ ≤ B.
Under this setting we want to estimate the k different means while minimizing the sum of the L22 losses
of all the estimates of the mean parameters.
We will show the invariance of this statistical game under the action of the group G = O(d) ×
O(d− 1)× . . .×O(d− k+ 1). But first we describe an element in the group and it’s operation on the
parameter and sample space.
An element of g ∈ G is made up of a sequence of k orthonormal matrices (g1, . . . , gk) such that for
a given set of parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θk) ∈ Rd×k (where each θi ∈ Rd) the matrix gi leaves the first
(i − 1) parameters unchanged, i.e. for j = 1, . . . , i − 1 giθj = θj . Hence the ith orthonormal matrix
has (d− i+ 1) degrees of freedom and can be viewed as an element in O(d− i+ 1).
The action of g on θ is defined as
gθ = g(θ1, . . . , θk)
= (gθ1, . . . , gθk)
= (gk . . . g1θ1, . . . , gk . . . g1θ1)
= (g1θ1, . . . , gi . . . g1θi, . . . , gk . . . g1θk)
where the last equality follows from the definition of our group. The group acts in a similar manner
on the sample space, i.e., for an X ∈ X gX = gk . . . g1X .
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Theorem E.1. The statistical game defined by mixture of k-Gaussians with identity covariance and
known mixture probabilities under L22 loss is invariant under the action of the group O(d)×O(d− 1)×
. . .×O(d− k + 1). Moreover, the quotient space is homeomorphic to (0, B]k × [0, π](k2).
Proof. First we show the invariance of the mixture distribution Pθ =
∑
i piN (θi, I), i.e., ifX ∼ Pθ then
gX ∼ Pgθ. Note that from the proof of Theorem 4.3 it follows that for a given normal distribution
N(θ˜, I) and an orthonormal matrix h ∈ O(d) s.t. hθ˜ = θ˜ if X ∼ N(θ˜, I) then hX ∼ N(hθ˜, I) =
N(θ˜, I). The invariance of P follows directly from this by substituting each ‖X − θi‖2 in the pdf with
‖gk . . . g1X − gk . . . g1θi‖2 and the definition of the group. The L22 loss is trivially invariant and hence
we establish the invariance of the statistical game.
Now, notice that for any two given parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θk), φ = (φ1, . . . , φk) ∈ Rdk if we
have the property that ∀i ‖θi‖ = ‖φi‖ and ∀i, j θTi θj = φTi φj then we can find orthonormal matrices
g1, . . . , gk s.t. ∀i gi . . . g1θi = φi. This follows from the following inductive argument: Assume we
have g1, . . . , gi−1 which satisfy the given constraints. Consider θ′ = gi−1 . . . g1θi. We have ∀j =
1, . . . , i − 1 θ′Tφj = θTi θj = φTi φj because gT = g−1. Now if φi lies in the span of φ1, . . . , φi−1 then
θ′ = φi and we can pick gi to be any orthonormal matrix which doesn’t transform this spanned space.
Otherwise, we can pick an orthonormal matrix which rotates the axis orthogonal to the spanned
subspace and in the direction of the high component of θ′ to the corresponding axis for φi. This
completes the desired construction.
It is easy to see that given θ, φ, g which satisfy gθ = φ, we have ∀i ‖θi‖ = ‖φi‖ and ∀i, j θTi θj =
φTi φj . Hence the equivalence classes are defined uniquely by the norms of the individual gaussians and
the angles between them, since there are k different norms and
(
k
2
)
many angles we can establish a
bijection between the quotient space and (0, B]k× [0, π](k2). The continuity of this map and it’s inverse
can easily be checked using the standard basis for both the topologies.
F Finite Gaussian Sequence Model
F.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
In this section we derive a closed-form expression for the minimizer θˆt of the following objective
argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
,
where DG is the set of deterministic estimators which are invariant to transformations of orthogonal
group O(d). From Lemma E.1, we know that for any invariant estimator θˆ ∈ DG and any g ∈ O(d),
R(θˆ, be1) = R(θˆ, bge1). So the above problem can be rewritten as follows
argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pt
[
Eθ∼Ub
[
R(θˆ, θ)
]]
,
where Ub is the uniform distribution over spherical shell of radius b, centered at origin; that is, its
density ub(θ) is defined as
ub(θ) ∝
{
0, if ‖θ‖2 6= b
b−d+1, otherwise
.
The above optimization problem can be further rewritten as
argmin
θˆ∈DG
R(θˆ,Πt),
where R(θˆ,Πt)
def
= Eθ∼Πt
[
R(θˆ, θ)
]
, and Πt is the distribution of a random variable θ which is generated
by first sampling b from Pt and then generating a sample from Ub. Note that Πt is a spherically
symmetric distribution. From Lemma E.2, we know that the Bayes estimator corresponding to any
invariant prior is an invariant estimator. So the minimization over DG in the above optimization
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problem can be replaced with minimization over the set of all estimators D. This leads us to the
following equivalent optimization problem
argmin
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ,Πt).
Let θˆt be the minimizer of this equivalent problem. We now obtain an expression for θˆt(X) in terms
of modified Bessel functions. Let Πt(·|X) be the posterior distribution of θ given the data X and let
p(X ; θ) be the probability density function for distribution Pθ. Since the risk is measured with respect
to ℓ22 metric, the Bayes estimator θˆt(X) is given by the posterior mean
θˆt(X) = Eθ∼Πt(·|X) [θ]
=
Eθ∼Πt [θp(X ; θ)]
Eθ∼Πt [p(X ; θ)]
=
Eb∼Pt
[∫
θub(θ)p(X ; θ)dθ
]
Eb∼Pt
[∫
ub(θ)p(X ; θ)dθ
] (definition of Πt)
=
Eb∼Pt
[
b−d+1
∫
‖θ‖2=b
θp(X ; θ)dθ
]
Eb∼Pt
[
b−d+1
∫
‖θ‖2=b
p(X ; θ)dθ
] (since Ub is uniform on sphere)
=
Eb∼Pt
[
b−d+1e−b
2/2
∫
‖θ‖2=b
θe〈X,θ〉dθ
]
Eb∼Pt
[
b−d+1e−b2/2
∫
‖θ‖2=b
e〈X,θ〉dθ
]
=
Eb∼Pt
[
b2e−b
2/2
∫
‖θ‖2=1
θeb〈X,θ〉dθ
]
Eb∼Pt
[
be−b2/2
∫
‖θ‖2=1
eb〈X,θ〉dθ
] (change of variables).
We now obtain a closed-form expression for the terms
∫
‖θ‖2=1
θeb〈X,θ〉dθ and
∫
‖θ‖2=1
eb〈X,θ〉dθ appearing
in the RHS of the above equation. We do this by relating them to the mean and normalization constant
of Von Mises-Fisher (vMF) distribution, which is a probability distribution on the unit sphere centered
at origin in Rd. This distribution is usually studied in directional statistics [53]. The probability density
function of a random unit vector Z ∈ Rd distributed according to vMF distribution is given by
p(Z;µ, κ) =
κd/2−1
(2π)d/2Id/2−1(κ)
exp(κ〈µ, Z〉),
where κ ≥ 0, ‖µ‖2 = 1, Iν is the modified Bessel function of the first kind of order ν. Using the fact
that a probability density function integrates to 1, we get the following closed-form expression for∫
‖θ‖2=1
eb〈X,θ〉dθ ∫
‖θ‖2=1
eb〈X,θ〉dθ =
(2π)d/2Id/2−1(b‖X‖2)
(b‖X‖2)d/2−1 . (28)
To get a closed-form expression for
∫
‖θ‖2=1
θeb〈X,θ〉dθ, we relate it to mean of vMF distribution.
We have the following expression for the mean of a random vector distributed according to vMF
distribution [54] ∫
‖Z‖=1
Zp(Z;µ, κ)dZ =
Id/2(κ)
Id/2−1(κ)
µ.
Using the above equality, we get the following expression for
∫
‖θ‖2=1
θeb〈X,θ〉dθ
∫
‖θ‖2=1
θeb〈X,θ〉dθ =
(2π)d/2Id/2(b‖X‖2)
(b‖X‖2)d/2−1
X
‖X‖2 . (29)
44
Substituting Equations (28), (29) in the expression for θˆt(X) obtained above, we get an expression for
θˆt(X) which involves the modified Bessel function Iν and integrals over variable b. We note that Iν
can be computed to very high accuracy and there exist accurate implementations of Iν in a number
of programming languages. So in our analysis of the approximation error of Algorithm 3, we assume
the error from the computation of Iν is 0.
F.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Before we present the proof of the Theorem we present useful intermediate results which we require in
our proof.
F.2.1 Intermediate Results
Lemma F.1 (Lipschitz Continuity). Consider the problem of finite Gaussian sequence model. Let
Θ = {θ : θ ∈ Rd, ‖θ‖2 ≤ B} be the ball of radius B centered at origin in Rd. Let θˆ be any estimator
which maps X to an element in Θ. Then the risk R(θˆ, θ) = EX∼N (θ,I)
[
‖θˆ(X)− θ‖22
]
is Lipschitz con-
tinuous in its second argument w.r.t ℓ2 norm over the domain Θ, with Lipschitz constant 4(B+
√
dB2).
Moreover, R(θˆ, be1) = EX∼N (θ,I)
[
‖θˆ(X)− be1‖22
]
is Lipschitz continuous in b over the domain [0, B],
with Lipschitz constant 4(B +B2).
Proof. Let Rθˆ(θ) = R(θˆ, θ). The gradient of Rθˆ(θ) with respect to θ is given by
∇θRθˆ(θ) = EX∼N (θ,I)
[
2(θ − θˆ(X)) + (X − θ)‖θˆ(X)− θ‖22
]
.
The norm of ∇θRθˆ(θ) can be upper bounded as follows
‖∇θRθˆ(θ)‖2 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣EX∼N (θ,I) [2(θ − θˆ(X))] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣EX∼N (θ,I) [(X − θ)‖θˆ(X)− θ‖22] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(a)
≤ 4B + Ex∼N (θ,I)
[
‖X − θ‖2‖θˆ(X)− θ‖22
]
(b)
≤ 4B + 4B2EX∼N (θ,I) [‖X − θ‖2]
≤ 4B + 4
√
dB2,
where the first term in (a) follows from the fact that θ, θˆ(X) ∈ Θ and the second term follows from
Jensen’s inequality. This shows that Rθˆ(θ) is Lipschitz continuous over Θ. This finishes the first
part of the proof. To show that R(θˆ, be1) is Lipschitz continuous in b, we use similar arguments. Let
Rθˆ(b) = R(θˆ, be1). Then∣∣∣R′
θˆ
(b)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ 〈e1,∇θRθˆ(θ)∣∣∣
θ=be1
〉 ∣∣∣
(a)
≤
∣∣∣EX∼N (be1,I) [2(b− [θˆ(X)]1)] ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∣∣EX∼N (be1,I) [(X1 − b)‖θˆ(X)− be1‖22] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 4B + Ex∼N (be1,I)
[
|X1 − b|‖θˆ(X)− be1‖22
]
≤ 4B + 4B2EX∼N (be1,I) [|X1 − b|]
≤ 4B + 4B2,
where (a) follows from the expression for ∇θRθˆ(θ) obtained above.
Lemma F.2 (Approximation of risk). Consider the setting of Lemma F.1. Let θˆ be any estimator
which maps X to an element in Θ. Let {Xi}Ni=1 be N i.i.d samples from N (θ, I). Then with probability
at least 1− δ ∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
‖θˆ(Xi)− θ‖22 −Rθˆ(θ)
∣∣∣ ≤ 4B2
√
log 1δ
N
.
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Proof. The proof of the Lemma relies on concentration properties of sub-Gaussian random variables.
Let Z(X) = ‖θˆ(X)− θ‖2. Note that Rθˆ(θ) = EX∼N (θ,I) [Z(X)]. Since Z(X) is bounded by 4B2, it is
a sub-Gaussian random variable. Using Hoeffding bound we get
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Z(Xi)− E [Z(X)]
∣∣∣ ≤ 4B2
√
log 1δ
N
, w.p ≥ 1− δ.
F.2.2 Main Argument
The proof relies on Corollary 3.2 to show that the averaged estimator θˆavg is approximately minimax
and PˆLFP is approximately least favorable. Here is a rough sketch of the proof. We first apply the
corollaries on the following reduced statistical game that we are aiming to solve
inf
θˆ∈DG
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆ, be1).
To apply these corollaries, we need the risk R(θˆ, be1) to be Lipscthiz continuous in b. This holds
for us because of Lemma F.1. Next, we convert the guarantees for the reduced statistical game to
the orginial statistical game to show that we learn a minimax estimator and LFP for finite Gaussian
sequence model.
To use Corollary 3.2, we first need to bound α, β, α′, the approximation errors of the optimization
subroutines described in Algorithms 2, 3. A major part of the proof involves bounding these quantities.
Approximation error of Algorithm 2. There are two causes for error in the optimization
oracle described in Algorithm 2: (a) grid search and (b) approximate computation of risk R(θˆ, be1).
We now bound the error due to both (a) and (b). From Lemma F.2 we know that for any estimator
θˆi and grid point bj , the following holds with probability at least 1− δ
∣∣∣ 1
N1
N1∑
k=1
‖θˆi(Xk)− bje1‖22 −R(θˆi, bje1)
∣∣∣ ≤ 4B2
√
log 1δ
N1
.
Taking a union bound over all estimators {θˆi}Ti=1 and grid points {bj}B/wj=1 , we can show that with
probability at least 1− δ, the following holds for all i ∈ [T ], j ∈ [B/w]
∣∣∣ 1
N1
N1∑
k=1
‖θˆi(Xk)− bje1‖22 −R(θˆi, bje1)
∣∣∣ ≤ 4B2
√
log BTwδ
N1
. (30)
Let ft,σ(b) be the actual objective we would like to optimize in iteration t of Algorithm 1, which
is given by
ft,σ(b) =
t−1∑
i=1
R(θˆi, be1) + σb.
Let fˆt,σ(b) be the approximate objective we are optimizing by replacing R(θˆi, be1) with its approximate
estimate. Let b∗t be a maximizer of ft,σ(b) and b
∗
t,approx be the maximizer of fˆt,σ(b) (which is also the
output of Algorithm 2). Finally, let b∗t,NN be the point on the grid which is closest to b
∗
t . Using
Lemma F.1 we first show that ft,σ(b) is Lipschitz continuous in b. The derivative of ft,σ(b) with
respect to b is given by
f ′t,σ(b) =
t−1∑
i=1
〈
e1,∇θR(θˆi, θ)
∣∣∣
θ=be1
〉
+ σ
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Using Lemma F.1, the magnitude of f ′t,σ(b) can be upper bounded as
|f ′t,σ(b)| ≤ 4(t− 1)(B + B2) + σ.
This shows that ft,σ(b) is Lipschitz continuous in b. We now bound ft,σ(b∗t ) − ft,σ(b∗t,approx), the
approximation error of the optimization oracle
ft,σ(b
∗
t )
(a)
≤ ft,σ(b∗t,NN) +
(
4t(B +B2) + σ
)
w
(b)
≤ fˆt,σ(b∗t,NN) + 4tB2
√
log BTwδ
N1
+
(
4t(B +B2) + σ
)
w
(c)
≤ fˆt,σ(b∗t,approx) + 4tB2
√
log BTwδ
N1
+
(
4t(B +B2) + σ
)
w
(d)
≤ ft,σ(b∗t,approx) + 8tB2
√
log BTwδ
N1
+
(
4t(B +B2) + σ
)
w,
where (a) follows from Lipschitz property of the loss function and (b), (d) follow from Equation (30)
and hold with probability at least 1 − δ and (c) follows from the optimality of b∗t,approx. This shows
that Algorithm 2 is a
(
O
(
TB2
√
log BT
wδ
N1
+ TB(1 +B)w
)
, w
)
-approximate maximization oracle; that
is
α = O

TB2
√
log BTwδ
N1
+ TB(1 +B)w

 , β = w.
Approximation error of Algorithm 3. There are two sources of approximation error in Al-
gorithm 3: (a) computation of modified Bessel functions Iν , and (b) approximation of Pt with its
samples. In this analysis we assume that Iν can be computed to very high accuracy. This is a reason-
able assumption because many programming languages have accurate and efficient implementations of
Iν . So the main focus here is on bounding the error from approximation of Pt.
First, note that since we are using grid search to optimize the maximization problem, the true
distribution Pt for which we are supposed to compute the Bayes estimator is a discrete distribution
supported on grid points {b1, . . . bB/w}. Algorithm 3 does not compute the Bayes estimator for Pt.
Instead, we generate samples from Pt and use them as a proxy for Pt. Let Pˆt be the empirical
distribution obtained by sampling N2 points from Pt. Let pt,j be the probability mass on grid point
bj . Using Bernstein inequality we can show that the following holds with probability at least 1− δ
∀j ∈ [B/w] |pˆt,j − pt,j| ≤
√
pt,j
log Bwδ
N2
. (31)
Define estimators θˆ′t, θˆt as
θˆ′t ← argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
, θˆt ← argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
.
θˆ′t is what we ideally want to compute. θˆt is what we end up computing using Algorithm 3. We now
show that θˆt is an approximate minimizer of the left hand side optimization problem above. To this
end, we try to bound the following quantity
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆt, be1)−R(θˆ′t, be1)
]
.
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Let ft(θˆ) = Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
and fˆt(θˆ) = Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
. We would like to bound the quantity
ft(θˆt)− ft(θˆ′t). Consider the following
ft(θˆt)
(a)
≤ fˆt(θˆt) + 4B
3
w
√
log Bwδ
N2
(b)
≤ fˆt(θˆ′t) +
4B3
w
√
log Bwδ
N2
(c)
≤ ft(θˆ′t) +
8B3
w
√
log Bwδ
N2
,
where (a) follows from Equation (31) and the fact that the risk R(θˆ, θ) of any estimator is bounded by
4B2, (b) follows since θˆt is a minimizer of fˆt and (c) follows from Equation (31). This shows that with
probability at least 1− δ, Algorithm 3 is an O
(
B3
w
√
log B
wδ
N2
)
-approximate optimization oracle; that is,
α′ = O

B3
w
√
log Bwδ
N2

 .
Minimax Estimator. We are now ready to show that θˆavg is an approximate minimax estimator.
Instantiating Corollary 3.2 for the reduced statistical game gives us the following bound, which holds
with probability at least 1− δ
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆavg, be1) ≤ inf
θˆ∈DG
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆ, be1) + O˜
(
B2(B + 1)√
T
+ α+ α′ + βB(B + 1)
√
T
)
,
where we used the fact that the risk R(θˆ, be1) is 4B(B + 1)-Lipschitz continuous w.r.t b. The O˜
notation in the above inequality hides logarithmic factors. Plugging in the values of α, α′, β in the
above equation gives us
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆavg, be1) ≤ inf
θˆ∈DG
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆ, be1) + O˜
(
B2(B + 1)√
T
)
.
We now convert this bound to a bound on the original statistical game. From Theorem 4.2 we know
that inf θˆ∈DG supb∈[0,B]R(θˆ, be1) = inf θˆ∈D supθ∈ΘR(θˆ, θ) = R
∗. Since the estimator θˆavg is invariant
to transformations of orthogonal group, we have R(θˆavg, θ) = R(θˆavg, ‖θ‖2e1) for any θ ∈ Θ. Using
these two results in the above inequality, we get
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆavg, θ) = sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆavg, be1) ≤ R∗ + O˜
(
B2(B + 1)√
T
)
.
This shows that the worst-case risk of θˆavg is close to the minimax risk R∗. This finishes the first part
of the proof.
LFP. To prove the second part, we rely on Corollary 3.2. Instantiating it for the reduced statistical
game gives us
inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
≥ R∗ − O˜
(
B2(B + 1)√
T
+ α+ α′ + βB(B + 1)
√
T
)
.
Plugging in the values of α, α′, β in the above equation gives us
inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
≥ R∗ − O˜
(
B2(B + 1)√
T
)
.
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From Equation (31) we know that Pt is close to Pˆt with high probability. Using this, we can replace
Pt in the above bound with Pˆt and obtain the following bound, which holds with probability at least
1− δ
inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
≥ R∗ − O˜
(
B2(B + 1)√
T
)
. (32)
In the rest of the proof, we show that inf θˆ∈DG
1
T
∑T
t=1 Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
= inf θˆ R(θˆ, PˆLFP). Recall, the
density function of PˆLFP is given by: pˆLFP(θ) ∝ ‖θ‖1−d2 Pˆavg(‖θ‖2), where Pˆavg(‖θ‖2) is the probability
mass placed by Pˆavg at ‖θ‖2. This distribution is equivalent to the distribution of a random variable
which is generated by first sampling b from Pˆt and then sampling θ from the uniform distribution
on (d − 1) dimensional sphere of radius b, centered at origin in Rd. Using this equivalence, we can
equivalently rewrite R(θˆ, PˆLFP) for any estimator θˆ as
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pˆt
[
Eθ∼U
[
R(θˆ, bθ)
]]
,
where U is the uniform distribution on the (d− 1) dimensional unit sphere centered at origin, in Rd.
Next, from Lemma E.2, we know that the Bayes estimator corresponding to any invariant prior is an
invariant estimator. Since PˆLFP is an invariant distribution, we have
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) = inf
θˆ∈DG
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) = inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pˆt
[
Eθ∼U
[
R(θˆ, bθ)
]]
.
From Lemma E.1 we know that for any invariant estimator θˆ, we have R(θˆ, θ1) = R(θˆ, θ2), whenever
θ1 ∼ θ2. Using this result in the above equation gives us
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) = inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
.
Combining the above result with Equation (32) shows that PˆLFP is approximately least favorable.
F.3 Loss on few co-ordinates
In this section, we present the optimization oracles for the problem of finite Gaussian sequence model,
when the loss is evaluated on a few co-ordinates. Recall, in Theorem 4.4 we showed that the original
min-max statistical game can be reduced to the following simpler problem
inf
θˆ∈MD,G
sup
b:b[1]2+b[2]2≤B2
R(θˆ, [b[1]e1,k, b[2]e1,d−k]), (33)
where b[j] represents the jth co-ordinate of b. We now provide efficient implementations of the opti-
mization oracles required by Algorithm 1 for finding a Nash equilibrium of this game. The optimization
problems corresponding to the two optimization oracles are as follows
θˆt ← argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, [b[1]e1,k, b[2]e1,d−k])
]
,
bt(σ)← argmax
b:b[1]2+b[2]2≤B2
t−1∑
i=1
R(θˆi, [b[1]e1,k, b[2]e1,d−k]) + 〈σ, b〉,
where DG is the set of deterministic invariant estimators and Pt is the distribution of random variable
bt(σ). The maximization oracle can be efficiently implemented via a grid search over {b : b[1]2+b[2]2 ≤
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B2} (see Algorithm 7). The minimization oracle can also be efficiently implemented. The minimizer
has a closed form expression which depends on Pt and modified Bessel functions (see Algorithm 8).
Algorithm 7 Maximization Oracle
1: Input: Number of coordinates to evaluate loss on k, estimators {θˆi}t−1i=1, perturbation σ, grid
width w, number of samples for computation of expected risk R(θˆ, θ): N1
2: Let {b1, b2 . . . bN(w)} be the w-covering of {b : b[1]2 + b[2]2 ≤ B2}
3: for j = 1 . . .N(w) do
4: for i = 1 . . . t− 1 do
5: Generate N1 independent samples {Xl}N1l=1 from the following distribution
N ([bj [1]e1,k, bj[2]e1,d−k], I)
6: Estimate R(θˆi, [bj [1]e1,k, bj [2]e1,d−k]) as
1
N1
N1∑
l=1
‖θˆi(Xl)[1 : k]− bj[1]e1,k‖22.
7: end for
8: Evaluate the objective at bj using the above estimates
9: end for
10: Output: bj which maximizes the objective
Algorithm 8 Minimization Oracle
1: Input: Samples {bi}N2i=1 generated from distribution Pt, number of coordinates to evaluate loss
on k.
2: For any X , compute θˆt(X) as(∑N2
i=1 wibi[1]Ak(bi[1]‖X [1 : k]‖2)∑N2
i=1 wi
)
X [1 : k]
‖X [1 : k]‖2 ,
where Ak(γ) =
Ik/2(γ)
Ik/2−1(γ)
,
wi = bi[1]
2− k
2 bi[2]
2− d−k
2 e−
‖b‖2
2 Ik/2−1(bi[1]‖X [1 : k]‖2)I(d−k)/2−1(bi[2]‖X [k+ 1 : d]‖2),
and Iν is the modified Bessel function of the first kind of order ν.
G Linear Regression
G.1 Proof of Proposition 6.1
In this section we derive a closed-form expression for the minimizer θˆt of the following objective
argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
.
Using the same arguments as in proof of Proposition 5.1, we can show that the above optimization
problem can be rewritten as the following equivalent optimization problem over the set of all deter-
ministic estimators
argmin
θˆ∈D
Eθ∼Πt
[
R(θˆ, θ)
]
,
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where Πt is the distribution of a random variable θ which is generated by first sampling a b from Pt
and then drawing a random sample from Ub, the uniform distribution on a spherical shell of radius b.
The density function of Ub is given by
ub(θ) ∝
{
0, if ‖θ‖2 6= b
b−d+1, otherwise
.
Since the risk is measured with respect to ℓ22 metric, the minimizer θˆt(Dn) is given by the posterior
mean
θˆt(Dn) = Eθ∼Πt(·|Dn) [θ]
=
Eθ∼Πt [θp(Dn; θ)]
Eθ∼Πt [p(Dn; θ)]
=
Eb∼Pt
[∫
θub(θ)p(Dn; θ)dθ
]
Eb∼Pt
[∫
ub(θ)p(Dn; θ)dθ
]
=
Eb∼Pt
[
b−d+1
∫
‖θ‖2=b
θp(Dn; θ)dθ
]
Eb∼Pt
[
b−d+1
∫
‖θ‖2=b
p(Dn; θ)dθ
]
=
Eb∼Pt
[
b−d+1
∫
‖θ‖2=b
θe−
‖Y−Xθ‖2
2
2 dθ
]
Eb∼Pt
[
b−d+1
∫
‖θ‖2=b
e−
‖Y−Xθ‖2
2
2 dθ
]
=
Eb∼Pt
[
b2
∫
‖θ‖2=1
θe−
b2‖Xθ‖2
2
−2b〈θ,XTY〉
2 dθ
]
Eb∼Pt
[
b
∫
‖θ‖2=1
e−
b2‖Xθ‖2
2
−2b〈θ,XTY〉
2 dθ
] (change of variables).
We now relate the terms appearing in the above expression to the mean and normalization constant
of Fisher-Bingham (FB) distribution. As stated in Section 6, the probability density function of a
random unit vector Z ∈ Rd distributed according to FB distribution is given by
p(Z;A, γ) = C(A, γ)−1 exp
(−ZTAZ + 〈γ, Z〉) ,
where Z ∈ Sd−1, and γ ∈ Rd, A ∈ Rd×d are the parameters of the distribution with A being positive
semi-definite and C(A, γ) is the normalization constant which is given by
C(A, γ) =
∫
‖Z‖2=1
exp
(−ZTAZ + 〈γ, Z〉) dZ.
The mean of Z is given by∫
‖Z‖2=1
Zp(Z;A, γ)dZ = C(A, γ)−1
∫
‖Z‖2=1
Z exp
(−ZTAZ + 〈γ, Z〉) dZ = C(A, γ)−1 ∂
∂γ
C(A, γ).
Using these in the previously derived expression for θˆ(Dn) gives us the required result.
G.2 Mean and normalization constant of Fisher-Bingham distribution
In this section, we present our technique for computation of C (A, γ). Once we have an accurate
technique for its computation, computing ∂∂γC(A, γ) should be straight forward as one can rely on
efficient numerical differentiation techniques for its computation. Recall, to implement Algorithm 5 we
need to compute C
(
2−1b2XTX, bXTY
)
. Let Σˆ = 1nX
T
X and let UΛUT be its eigen decomposition.
Then it is easy to see that C
(
2−1b2XTX, bXTY
)
can be rewritten as
C
(
2−1b2XTX, bXTY
)
= C(2−1nb2Λ, bUTXTY).
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So it suffices to compute C(A, γ) for some positive semi-definite, diagonal matrix A and vector γ. Let
ai be the ith diagonal entry of A and let γi be the ith element of γ. Kume and Wood [46] derive the
following expression for C(A, γ)
C(A, γ) = (2π)d/2
(
d∏
i=1
a
−1/2
i
)
exp
(
1
4
d∑
i=1
γ2i
ai
)
fA,γ(1),
where fA,γ is the probability density of a non-central chi-squared random variable
∑d
i=1 z
2
i with zi ∼
N ( γi2ai , 12ai ). There are number of efficient techniques for computation of fA,γ(1) [46, 47]. We first
present the technique of Imhof [47] for exact computation of fA,γ(1). Imhof [47] showed that fA,γ(1)
can be written as the following integral
fA,γ(1) = π
−1
∫ ∞
0
[ρ(u)]−1 cos ζ(u)du,
where ρ : R→ R and ζ : R→ R are defined as
ζ(u) =
1
2
d∑
i=1
(
tan−1
(
u
2ai
)
+
γ2i
8a3i
(
1 +
u2
4a2i
)−1
u
)
− 1
2
u,
ρ(u) =
d∏
i=1
(
1 +
u2
4a2i
)1/4
exp
(
1
32
(uγi/a
2
i )
2
1 + u
2
4a2i
)
.
One can rely on numerical integration techniques to compute the above integral to desired accuracy.
In our analysis of the approximation error of Algorithm 5, we assume the error from the computation
of fA,γ(1) is negligible.
Before we conclude this subsection, we present another technique for computation of fA,γ(1),
which is typically faster than the above approach. This approach was proposed by Kume and Wood
[46] and relies on the saddle point density approximation technique. While this approach is faster, the
downside of it is that it only provides an approximate estimate of fA,γ(1). To explain this method,
we first present some facts about non-central chi-squared random variables. The cumulant generating
function of a non-central chi-squared random variable with density fA,γ is given by
K(t) =
d∑
i=1
(
−1
2
log
(
1− t
ai
)
+
1
4
γ2i
ai − t −
γ2i
4ai
)
(t < min
i
ai).
The first derivative of K(t) is given by
K(1)(t) =
d∑
i=1
(
1
2
1
ai − t +
1
4
γ2i
(ai − t)2
)
,
and higher derivatives are given by
K(j)(t) =
d∑
i=1
(
(j − 1)!
2
1
(ai − t)j +
j!
4
γ2i
(ai − t)j+1
)
, (j ≥ 2).
Let tˆ be the unique solution in (−∞,mini ai) to the saddle point equation K(1)(tˆ) = 1. Kume and
Wood [46] show that tˆ has finite upper and lower bounds
min
i
ai − d
4
− 1
2
(
d2
4
+ dmax
i
γ2i
)1/2
≤ tˆ ≤ min
i
ai − 1
4
− 1
2
(
1
4
+ γ2min
)1/2
,
where γmin is equal to γi∗ for i∗ = argmini ai. So, to find tˆ, one can perform grid search in the above
range. Given tˆ, the first-order saddle point density approximation of fA,γ(1) is given by
fˆA,γ,1(1) =
(
2πK(2)(tˆ)
)−1/2
exp(K(tˆ)− tˆ).
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The second-order saddle point density approximation of Zg,h(1) is given by
fˆA,γ,2(1) = fˆA,γ,1(1)(1 + T ),
where T = 18 ρˆ4 − 524 ρˆ23, where ρˆj = K(j)(tˆ)/(K(2)(tˆ))j/2.
G.3 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Before we present the proof of the Theorem we present useful intermediate results which we require in
our proof.
G.3.1 Intermediate Results
Lemma G.1 (Lipschitz Continuity). Consider the problem of linear regression described in Section 4.2.
Let Θ = {θ : θ ∈ Rd, ‖θ‖2 ≤ B} and let θˆ be any estimator which maps the data Dn = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1
to an element in Θ. Then the risk R(θˆ, θ) = EDn
[
‖θˆ(Dn)− θ‖22
]
is Lipschitz continuous in its sec-
ond argument w.r.t ℓ2 norm over the domain Θ, with Lipschitz constant 4(B + B
2
√
nd). Moreover,
R(θˆ, be1) = EDn
[
‖θˆ(Dn)− be1‖22
]
is Lipschitz continuous in b over the domain [0, B], with Lipschitz
constant 4(B +B2
√
n).
Proof. Let Rθˆ(θ) = R(θˆ, θ). The gradient of Rθˆ(θ) with respect to θ is given by
∇θRθˆ(θ) = EDn
[
2(θ − θˆ(Dn))
]
+ EDn
[
‖θˆ(Dn)− θ‖22XT (Y −Xθ)
]
,
where X = [X1, X2, . . .Xn]T ,Y = [Y1, . . . Yn]. The norm of ∇θRθˆ(θ) can be upper bounded as follows
‖∇θRθˆ(θ)‖2 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣EDn [2(θ − θˆ(Dn))] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣EDn [‖θˆ(Dn)− θ‖22XT (Y −Xθ)] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(a)
≤ 4B + EDn
[
‖XT (Y −Xθ)‖2‖θˆ(Dn)− θ‖22
]
(b)
≤ 4B + 4B2EDn
[‖XT (Y −Xθ)‖2]
≤ 4B + 4B2
√
nd,
where the first term in (a) follows from the fact that θ, θˆ(X) ∈ Θ and the second term follows from
Jensen’s inequality. This shows that Rθˆ(θ) is Lipschitz continuous over Θ. This finishes the first
part of the proof. To show that R(θˆ, be1) is Lipschitz continuous in b, we use similar arguments. Let
Rθˆ(b) = R(θˆ, be1). Then∣∣∣R′
θˆ
(b)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣〈e1,∇θRθˆ(θ)∣∣∣
θ=be1
〉 ∣∣∣
(a)
≤
∣∣∣EDn [2(b− [θˆ(Dn)]1)] ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∣∣EDn [eT1 XT (Y −Xθ)‖θˆ(Dn)− be1‖22] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 4B + 4B2EDn
[|eT1 XT (Y −Xθ)|]
≤ 4B + 4B2√n,
where (a) follows from our bound for ‖∇θRθˆ(θ)‖2 obtained above.
Lemma G.2 (Approximation of risk). Consider the setting of Lemma G.1. Let θˆ be any estimator
which maps Dn to an element in Θ. Let {Dn,k}Nk=1 be N independent datasets generated from the
linear regression model with true parameter θ. Then with probability at least 1− δ
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
‖θˆ(Dn,i)− θ‖22 −Rθˆ(θ)
∣∣∣ ≤ 4B2
√
log 1δ
N
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Proof. The proof of the Lemma relies on concentration properties of sub-Gaussian random variables.
Let Z(Dn) = ‖θˆ(Dn)− θ‖2. Note that Rθˆ(θ) = EDn [Z(Dn)]. Since Z(Dn) is bounded by 4B2, it is a
sub-Gaussian random variable. Using Hoeffding bound we get
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Z(Dn,i)− E [Z(Dn)]
∣∣∣ ≤ 4B2
√
log 1δ
N
, w.p ≥ 1− δ.
G.3.2 Main Argument
The proof uses exactly the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 5.1. The only difference between
the two proofs are the Lipschitz constants derived in Lemmas F.1, G.1. The Lipschitz constant in the
case of regression is O(B+B2
√
n), whereas in the case of finite Gaussian sequence model it is O(B+B2).
Approximation Error of Algorithm 4. There are two causes for error in the optimization
oracle described in Algorithm 4: (a) grid search and (b) approximate computation of risk R(θˆ, be1).
We now bound the error due to both (a) and (b). From Lemma G.2 we know that for any estimator
θˆi and grid point bj , the following holds with probability at least 1− δ
∣∣∣ 1
N1
N1∑
k=1
‖θˆi(Dn,k)− bje1‖22 −R(θˆi, bje1)
∣∣∣ ≤ 4B2
√
log 1δ
N1
.
Taking a union bound over all estimators {θˆi}Ti=1 and grid points {bj}B/wj=1 , we can show that with
probability at least 1− δ, the following holds for all i ∈ [T ], j ∈ [B/w]
∣∣∣ 1
N1
N1∑
k=1
‖θˆi(Dn,k)− bje1‖22 −R(θˆi, bje1)
∣∣∣ ≤ 4B2
√
log BTwδ
N1
. (34)
Let ft,σ(b) be the actual objective we would like to optimize in iteration t of Algorithm 1, which is
given by
ft,σ(b) =
t−1∑
i=1
R(θˆi, be1) + σb.
Let fˆt,σ(b) be the approximate objective we are optimizing by replacing R(θˆi, be1) with its approximate
estimate. Let b∗t be a maximizer of ft,σ(b) and b
∗
t,approx be the maximizer of fˆt,σ(b) (which is also the
output of Algorithm 4). Finally, let b∗t,NN be the point on the grid which is closest to b
∗
t . Using
Lemma G.1 we first show that ft,σ(b) is Lipschitz continuous in b. The derivative of ft,σ(b) with
respect to b is given by
f ′t,σ(b) =
t−1∑
i=1
〈
e1,∇θR(θˆi, θ)
∣∣∣
θ=be1
〉
+ σ
Using Lemma G.1, the magnitude of f ′t,σ(b) can be upper bounded as
|f ′t,σ(b)| ≤ 4(t− 1)(B +B2
√
n) + σ.
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This shows that ft,σ(b) is Lipschitz continuous in b. We now bound ft,σ(b∗t ) − ft,σ(b∗t,approx), the
approximation error of the optimization oracle
ft,σ(b
∗
t )
(a)
≤ ft,σ(b∗t,NN) +
(
4t(B +B2
√
n) + σ
)
w
(b)
≤ fˆt,σ(b∗t,NN) + 4tB2
√
log BTwδ
N1
+
(
4t(B +B2
√
n) + σ
)
w
(c)
≤ fˆt,σ(b∗t,approx) + 4tB2
√
log BTwδ
N1
+
(
4t(B +B2
√
n) + σ
)
w
(d)
≤ ft,σ(b∗t,approx) + 8tB2
√
log BTwδ
N1
+
(
4t(B +B2
√
n) + σ
)
w,
where (a) follows from Lipschitz property of the loss function and (b), (d) follow from Equation (34)
and hold with probability at least 1 − δ and (c) follows from the optimality of b∗t,approx. This shows
that Algorithm 4 is a
(
O
(
TB2
√
log BT
wδ
N1
+ TB(1 +B
√
n)w
)
, w
)
-approximate maximization oracle;
that is
α = O

TB2
√
log BTwδ
N1
+ TB(1 +B
√
n)w

 , β = w.
Approximation Error of Algorithm 5. There are two sources of approximation error in
Algorithm 5: (a) computation of mean and normalization constant of FB distribution, and (b) ap-
proximation of Pt with its samples. In this analysis we assume that mean and normalization constant
of FB distribution can be computed to very high accuracy. So the main focus here is on bounding the
error from approximation of Pt.
First, note that since we are using grid search to optimize the maximization problem, the true
distribution Pt for which we are supposed to compute the Bayes estimator is a discrete distribution
supported on grid points {b1, . . . bB/w}. Algorithm 5 does not compute the Bayes estimator for Pt.
Instead, we generate samples from Pt and use them as a proxy for Pt. Let Pˆt be the empirical
distribution obtained by sampling N2 points from Pt. Let pt,j be the probability mass on grid point
bj . Using Bernstein inequality we can show that the following holds with probability at least 1− δ
∀j ∈ [B/w] |pˆt,j − pt,j| ≤
√
pt,j
log Bwδ
N2
. (35)
Define estimators θˆ′t, θˆt as
θˆ′t ← argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
, θˆt ← argmin
θˆ∈DG
Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
.
θˆ′t is what we ideally want to compute. θˆt is what we end up computing using Algorithm 5. We now
show that θˆt is an approximate minimizer of the left hand side optimization problem above. To this
end, we try to bound the following quantity
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆt, be1)−R(θˆ′t, be1)
]
.
Let ft(θˆ) = Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
and fˆt(θˆ) = Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
. We would like to bound the quantity
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ft(θˆt)− ft(θˆ′t). Consider the following
ft(θˆt)
(a)
≤ fˆt(θˆt) + 4B
3
w
√
log Bwδ
N2
(b)
≤ fˆt(θˆ′t) +
4B3
w
√
log Bwδ
N2
(c)
≤ ft(θˆ′t) +
8B3
w
√
log Bwδ
N2
,
where (a) follows from Equation (35) and the fact that the risk R(θˆ, θ) of any estimator is bounded by
4B2, (b) follows since θˆt is a minimizer of fˆt and (c) follows from Equation (35). This shows that with
probability at least 1− δ, Algorithm 5 is an O
(
B3
w
√
log B
wδ
N2
)
-approximate optimization oracle; that is,
α′ = O

B3
w
√
log Bwδ
N2

 .
The rest of the proof is same as the proof of Theorem 5.1 and involves substituting the approxi-
mation errors computed above in Corollary 3.2.
Minimax Estimator. We now show that θˆavg is an approximate minimax estimator. Instantiating
Corollary 3.2 for the reduced statistical game gives us the following bound, which holds with probability
at least 1− δ
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆavg, be1) ≤ inf
θˆ∈DG
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆ, be1) + O˜
(
B2(B
√
n+ 1)√
T
+ α+ α′ + βB(B
√
n+ 1)
√
T
)
,
where we used the fact that the risk R(θˆ, be1) is 4B(B
√
n + 1)-Lipschitz continuous w.r.t b. The O˜
notation in the above inequality hides logarithmic factors. Plugging in the values of α, α′, β in the
above equation gives us
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆavg, be1) ≤ inf
θˆ∈DG
sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆ, be1) + O˜
(
B2(B
√
n+ 1)√
T
)
.
We now convert this bound to a bound on the original statistical game. From Theorem 4.2 we know
that inf θˆ∈DG supb∈[0,B]R(θˆ, be1) = inf θˆ∈D supθ∈ΘR(θˆ, θ) = R
∗. Since the estimator θˆavg is invariant
to transformations of orthogonal group, we have R(θˆavg, θ) = R(θˆavg, ‖θ‖2e1) for any θ ∈ Θ. Using
these two results in the above inequality, we get
sup
θ∈Θ
R(θˆavg, θ) = sup
b∈[0,B]
R(θˆavg, be1) ≤ R∗ + O˜
(
B2(B
√
n+ 1)√
T
)
.
This shows that the worst-case risk of θˆavg is close to the minimax risk R∗. This finishes the first part
of the proof.
LFP. To prove the second part, we rely on Corollary 3.2. Instantiating it for the reduced statistical
game gives us
inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
≥ R∗ − O˜
(
B2(B
√
n+ 1)√
T
+ α+ α′ + βB(B
√
n+ 1)
√
T
)
.
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Plugging in the values of α, α′, β in the above equation gives us
inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
≥ R∗ − O˜
(
B2(B
√
n+ 1)√
T
)
.
From Equation (31) we know that Pt is close to Pˆt with high probability. Using this, we can replace
Pt in the above bound with Pˆt and obtain the following bound, which holds with probability at least
1− δ
inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
≥ R∗ − O˜
(
B2(B
√
n+ 1)√
T
)
. (36)
In the rest of the proof, we show that inf θˆ∈DG
1
T
∑T
t=1 Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
= inf θˆ R(θˆ, PˆLFP). From the
definition of PˆLFP, we can equivalently rewrite R(θˆ, PˆLFP) for any estimator θˆ as
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pˆt
[
Eθ∼U
[
R(θˆ, bθ)
]]
,
where U is the uniform distribution on the (d− 1) dimensional unit sphere centered at origin, in Rd.
Next, from Lemma E.2, we know that the Bayes estimator corresponding to any invariant prior is an
invariant estimator. Since PˆLFP is an invariant distribution, we have
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) = inf
θˆ∈DG
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) = inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pˆt
[
Eθ∼U
[
R(θˆ, bθ)
]]
.
From Lemma E.1 we know that for any invariant estimator θˆ, we have R(θˆ, θ1) = R(θˆ, θ2), whenever
θ1 ∼ θ2. Using this result in the above equation gives us
inf
θˆ∈D
R(θˆ, PˆLFP) = inf
θˆ∈DG
1
T
T∑
t=1
Eb∼Pˆt
[
R(θˆ, be1)
]
.
Combining the above result with Equation (36) shows that PˆLFP is approximately least favorable.
H Covariance Estimation
H.1 Proof of Proposition 7.1
In this proof, we rely on permutation invariant functions and a representer theorem for such functions.
A function f : Rd → R is called permutation invariant, if for any permutation π and any X ∈ Rd
f(π(X)) = f(X).
The following proposition provides a representer theorem for such functions.
Proposition H.1 (Zaheer et al. [55]). A function f(X) from Rd to R is permutation invariant and
continuous iff it can be decomposed in the form ρ(
∑d
i=1 φ(Xi)), for some suitable transformations
φ : R→ Rd+1 and ρ : Rd+1 → R.
We now prove Proposition 7.1. First note that from Blackwell’s theorem we know that there
exists a minimax estimator which is just a function of the sufficient statistic, which in this case is the
empirical covariance Sn = 1n
∑n
i=1XiX
T
i [see Theorem 2.1 of 4]. So we restrict ourselves to estimators
which are functions of Sn. This, together with Theorem 4.1, shows that there is a minimax estimator
which is a function Sn and which is invariant under the action of the orthogonal group O(d). Let
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Σˆ be such an estimator. Since Σˆ is an invariant estimator, it satisfies the following equality for any
orthogonal matrix V
Σˆ(V SnV
T ) = V Σˆ(Sn)V
T .
Setting V = UT in the above equation, we get Σˆ(Sn) = U Σˆ(∆)UT . Hence, Σˆ is completely determined
by it’s action on diagonal matrices. So, in the rest of the proof we try to understand Σˆ(∆). Again
relying on invariance of Σˆ and setting V = ∆′UT for some diagonal matrix ∆′ with diagonal elements
±1, we get
Σˆ(∆′∆∆′) = ∆′UT Σˆ(Sn)U∆
′ (a)= ∆′Σˆ(∆)∆′,
where (a) follows from the fact that Σˆ(Sn) = U Σˆ(∆)UT . Since ∆′∆∆′ = ∆, the above equation shows
that ∆′Σˆ(∆)∆′ = Σˆ(∆) for any diagonal matrix ∆′ with diagonal elements ±1. This shows that Σˆ(∆)
is a diagonal matrix. Next, we set V = PpiUT , where Ppi is the permutation matrix corresponding to
some permutation π. This gives us
Σˆ(Ppi∆P
T
pi ) = PpiΣˆ(∆)P
T
pi .
This shows that for any permutation π, Σˆ(π(∆)) = π(Σˆ(∆)), where π(∆) represents permutation of
the diagonal elements of ∆. In the rest of the proof, we use the notation ∆i to denote the ith diagonal
entry of ∆ and Σˆi(∆) to denote the ith diagonal entry of Σˆ(∆). The above property of Σˆ shows
that Σˆi(∆) doesn’t depend on the ordering of the elements in {∆j}j 6=i. This follows by choosing any
permutation π which keeps the ith element fixed. Next, by considering the permutation which only
exchanges positions 1 and i, we get
Σˆi(∆1, . . .∆i, . . .∆d) = Σˆ1(∆i, . . .∆1, . . .∆d).
Thus Σˆi can be expressed in terms of Σˆ1. Represent Σˆ1 by Σˆ0. Combining the above two properties,
we have
Σˆi(∆) = Σˆ0(∆i, {∆j}j 6=i),
where {∆j}j 6=i represents the independence of Σˆ0 on the ordering of elements {∆j}j 6=i. Now, consider
the function Σˆ0(∆1, {∆j}dj=2). For any fixed a, and ∆1 = a, Σˆ0(a, {∆j}dj=2) is a permutation invariant
function. Using Proposition H.1, Σˆ0(a, {∆j}dj=2) can be written as
Σˆ0(a, {∆j}dj=2) = fa

 d∑
j=2
ga(∆j)

 ,
for some functions fa, ga. We overload the notation and define fa(x) = f(a, x) and ga(x) = g(a, x).
Using this, we can represent Σˆi(∆) as
Σˆi(∆) = f

∆i,∑
j 6=i
g(∆i,∆j)

 ,
for some functions f, g. There is a small technicality which we ignored while using Proposition H.1 on
Σˆ0. Proposition H.1 only holds for continuous functions. Since Σˆ0 is not guaranteed to be continuous,
the proposition can’t be used on this function. However, this is not an issue because any measurable
function is a limit of continuous functions. Since Σˆ0 is a measurable function, it can be approximated
arbitrarily close in the form of fa
(∑d
j=2 ga(∆j)
)
.
To conclude the proof of the proposition, we note that
inf
Σˆ∈MD,G
sup
λ∈ΞG
R(Σˆ,Diag(λ)) = inf
Σˆ∈Mf,g
sup
λ∈ΞG
R(Σˆ,Diag(λ)).
This is because the minimax estimator can be approximated arbitrarily well using estimators of the
form Σˆi(∆) = f
(
∆i,
∑
j 6=i g(∆i,∆j)
)
and the fact that the model class has absolutely continuous
distributions.
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I Entropy Estimation
I.1 Proof of Proposition 8.1
First note that any estimator of entropy is a function of Pˆn, which is a sufficient statistic for the problem.
This, together with Theorem 4.1, shows that there is a minimax estimator which is a function of Pˆn
and which is invariant under the action of permutation group. Let fˆ : Rd → R be such an estimator.
Since fˆ is invariant, it satisfies the following property for any permutation π
fˆ(π(Pˆn)) = fˆ(Pˆn).
If fˆ(Pˆn) is continuous, then Proposition H.1 shows that it can written as g
(∑d
j=1 h(pˆj)
)
, for some
functions h : R → Rd+1, g : Rd+1 → R. Even if it is not continuous, since it is a measurable
function, it is a limit of continuous functions. So fˆ can be approximated arbitrarily close in the form
of g
(∑d
j=1 h(pˆj)
)
. This also implies the statistical game in Equation (17) can reduced to the following
problem
inf
fˆ∈MD,G
sup
P∈PG
R(fˆ , P ) = inf
fˆ∈Mg,h
sup
P∈PG
R(fˆ , P ).
J Experiments
J.1 Covariance Estimation
In this section, we compare the performance of various estimators at randomly generated Σ’s. We use
beta distribution to randomly generate Σ’s with varying spectral decays and compute the average risks
of all the estimators at these Σ’s. Figure 2 presents the results from this experiment. It can be seen
that our estimator has better average case performance than empirical and James Stein estimators.
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Figure 2: Risk of various estimators for covariance estimation evaluated at randomly generated Σ’s.
We generated multiple Σ’s whose eigenvalues are randomly sampled from a Beta distribution with
various parameters and averaged the risks of estimators at these Σ’s. Plots on the left correspond to
d = 5 and the plots on the right correspond to d = 10.
J.2 Entropy Estimation
In this section, we compare the performance of various estimators at randomly generated P ’s. We
use beta distribution to randomly generate P ’s and compute the average risks of all the estimators at
these P ’s. Figure 3 presents the results from this experiment.
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Figure 3: Risk of various estimators for entropy estimation evaluated at randomly generated distri-
butions. We generated multiple P ’s with pi’s sampled from a Beta distribution and averaged the risks
of estimators at these P ’s.
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